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MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

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THE WRITER'S TRIBUNE

Army and Culture

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[Article by Karem Rash: "Army and Culture"; continuation, for previous installments see VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, Issue Nos 2, 3, 4, 5, 1989]

[Text] Will the Bolsheviks remain in power?—This can be heard among the people today. This is asked more often by those persons "who are ashamed of the state"...

At one time, Napoleon said that four newspapers could do more than an army of 100,000. Since then there have been changes in the newspaper runs and the influence on society while television has strengthened this a thousand-fold. No one would be so bold as to deny that the press is a weapon in the ideological struggle for hearts and minds.

"The fate of society depends upon at what this force is directed and this can be both a good as well as truly a weapon of mass defeat." It is possible to act in defense of healthy principles only in a strictly party or army press. This cannot help but cause alarm. Too many bodies have their pens at the ready to tar anyone who does not agree with a repressive understanding of perestroika and which can even arise in collections with a nervously Procrustean title "There Is No Other Way." Such set titles are born out of the sterile desperation of people who do not have their roots in the people and do not possess positive ideas.

Now when all the brave swingers of fists after the fight label everyone who stood for the strengthening of the state as "Stalinists," the time has come to ask, "What about the starving juveniles by the machine? They were also Stalinists, and at Magnitka the young fellows who cut the pockets out of their trousers to make mittens, were they also Stalinists? And were all those who fell at Khasan, Khalkhin-Gol, the Chinese East Railroad, in the war against Nazism and those who perished in the passes of Afghanistan—were they also obscurantists? Certainly many of them were party members. Why could Bolshevism stir the enormous strata of people? Only because, having given the land to the peasants, it awoke in the masses of people the millennium-old Russian idea of social justice. Because Bolshevism, a phenomenon and not as a teaching, was in sympathy with the deep aspirations of the people.

In the word "Bolshevik" the popular ear has also caught "bolshak" as head of family, as a high road and as a leader—defender since the times of Ilya Muromets the

800th anniversary of whose death was not celebrated by the "supporters of perestroika." Georgiy Konstantinovich Zhukov, both as a former holder of the cross of St. George as well as Hero of the Soviet Union the embodiment of the party type of Bolshevik and People's Defender.

The nation has held out for 70 years not by repression but in spite of them due to the thousands of Zhukov-type Bolsheviks. The future belongs only to them. It is they who cast the steel, sow the grain, serve in the Army and pilot aircraft. All the "Afghaners" [Afghan veterans] are the children of Zhukov. Even the "supporters of perestroika" are obligated to Zhukov not only for allowing them to escape the gas chambers but also from Beriia's understanding of Marxism.

The people took their own view of such a particular feature of the word "Bolshevik" as its failure to be found in any foreign political lexicon. And this does not contradict real internationalism.

Here I am acting solely on my own behalf without being authorized by anyone and without representing anyone. This is an action not by assignment but rather by involvement. I consider myself involved and responsible to that force of spirit which preserved, safeguarded and guided Russian culture through the centuries of testings by pestilence, famine, invasions, fire, spear, executions, repressions, alcohol and times of trouble, involved in each wheelbarrow and hack of the Gulag and with all the children who did not survive their parents on the slopes of the "pit." All the martyrs of this path are my fellow travelers and witnesses, they are all the architects of that edifice which I have inherited as a monument to their selfless service and tortures, and as a holy relic. Its name is the Soviet state. It is a magnificent and glorious creation, a temple which we have been commanded to strengthen, cleanse, build up and protect.

A majority of those whom the sated accusers now style as bureaucrats were unconscious servants to the degree of their small forces and abilities to that very idea which was embodied in our state and which could not be destroyed either by the Trotskys, the Stalins and all the more it is not within the power now of those who most of all pay homage to perestroika but actually constantly give a meaningful wink to the West.

The Bolsheviks firmly hold power. But many newspapers and magazines are confusing the people and spreading panic and do not let society see the historic road. For this reason the people become lost and are aware of a hazy disquiet. Not everyone realizes that unfounded criticism is a sign of impotence and it is sterile. Nevertheless, whether or not the Bolsheviks remain in power depends largely on whether they support the school and whether they can bring television and the various entertainment organizations out of stagnating decomposition.

So where are we heading?

At present, everyone is asking himself this question. Some out of curiosity, others with hope but more often with alarm. Glasnost is a school of civil courage, maturity, responsibility and rectitude. Do these achievements accompany our lives?

There are many negative phenomena in our life. We are taught: let the children select their teacher and the soldiers their commander. What good democrats they are! But how concerned are they for the children and the soldiers. From the experience of all times and out of common sense this would lead to the destruction of the school and the army, to a disaster, defeat and the death of the same children and soldiers.

Could a soldier select his company officer? Only an army of suicides could permit itself such a thing. Zhukov, the greatest of the military authorities, wrote in his "Vospominaniya i razmyshleniya" [Remembrances and Reflections]:

"The absence of one-man command in military affairs, as V.I. Lenin pointed out,...more often than not inevitably leads to disaster, chaos, panic, the dividing of power and defeat." And out of Lenin's list of what "the absence of one-man command" can lead to, we would emphasize one thing "panic." For this spreads concern and panic in society and leads to destruction.

We ceased holding meetings at school and organizing the pedagogics of cooperation in the 1920s almost simultaneously with the famous military reform when in 1924, a Central Committee commission recognized that the Red Army, as an organized, trained, politically indoctrinated and well-supported force, did not presently exist and that it was not battleworthy. Virtually the same could be said about our school which was destroyed by the then pedagogics of collaboration, by "innovativeness" and "experiments." Certainly, we inherited one of the world's best schools if one judges from the textbooks and the army of dedicated teachers.

Pedagogics is a multidimensional concept, it is profound and as real reaching encompasses all the life of mankind and is inexhaustible as life itself. True pedagogics must presuppose cooperation. The latter is one of its very many components, a sort of small part of it. It is ignorant and far of the mark to call the entire phenomenon from one of the tools of teaching or by a part. Such a combination of the whole, that is, pedagogics with one small part of it, inevitably distorts and destroys the whole. You see, again destruction. Is pedagogics really conceivable without tact? So we permit on the TV screen a new "innovator" so that he could confuse the hundred-million-strong audience with the "pedagogics of reciprocity," and the "pedagogics of equality" or the "pedagogics of trust" or even the "pedagogics of responsibility".... One could go on forever. But for a long time via the blue chaff of the TV we have been inflating, like the gypsy and the mare, the next innovator be he in education, in science, in the economy or in the social sphere, instead of educating and urging the viewer to be

responsible, serious, thoughtful and loyal to the moral standards worked out over the millennia by the sacrificers of the people's zealots. Glasnost is not a signal for revenge for the "new innovators." Once their predecessors with the "proletkult" "pedagogics of cooperation" during the terrible 1920s virtually destroyed our school created over the centuries by unnoticed labor, by the conscientious service of thousands of nameless teachers of the Ushinskiy breed.

A child goes to school to develop, to test himself, to grow morally, mentally and physically, but not to collaborate. In order to grow, one needs a standard and not a collaborator. In indulging, overplaying and collaborating, they began to call the schoolchildren to the holy of holies, the pedagogical council. This is like a "new democrat" on a naval ship who, in "adapting himself," began to summon several sailors from time to time for a dinner in the wardroom. This would violate discipline, procedures and most importantly would belittle the sailor himself and the entire crew. This spying and falseness introduces into the crew and school a lie and ambiguity arising out of the same germ of familiarity.

The calling of the school is to prepare one for life. Life is not a holiday, I repeat, and school is not pleasure and not a debating club. School must prepare one for the vicissitudes of life, labor, hardships and courage. School must teach one to do not only the pleasurable but, on the contrary, instill the ability, with clenched teeth, to also overcome the boring cramming and much else. By television and newspapers we are inclined not to overcome something but rather to whining because of the work as the schoolchild responds sullenly and constantly. With this same attitude he goes into the army. And there like a TV set he wants a miracle innovator. But our viewer has long ceased thinking and choosing and has become like a certain passive receiver but on the other hand is ready for unfounded views. The teacher in the province and the schoolchildren a long time ago were confident that Father Christmas, the innovator, would knock at their school. His sack would be full of miracles and at least the cancelling of homework assignments. The teachers were confident that at the bottom of the sack there was a new plan which would free them from the commissions and the bureaucratic methods. The innovator already had one foot inside the school door but the evil bureaucrat uncles from the Ministry of Education made off with the sack and drove off the good innovator from the school he should have saved. And so there are calls...letters...complaints...and shouts.

"Let's have the innovator!..."

By doing so we learn to accuse not ourselves, we do not learn strictness for ourselves but rather indulge in our favorite hunting for scapegoats.

We have thousands of true masters in the expanses of our country, they are industrious and unnoticed. The teachers who are declared to be "innovators" in reality are merely lively, good teachers which should exist in

each school. Possibly, we have already reached the point where a teacher who simply does good work is such a rarity that he is included in the "innovators"?... Each of the "new innovators" may be simple, orderly and merely charming people. If the teacher says to the children in first grade: "Quiet, children, Shota has fallen asleep in the lesson and let him sleep a bit," on the ordinary level such a teacher is even sweet and sympathetic, albeit rather eccentric. But when this is described before the entire nation as an indication of his "method" and certainly a "new one" by the Corresponding Member of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, Shalva Amonashvili, this, in being magnified and blown up by television, already distorts a minor episode. To the kind Amonashvili it might reasonably be pointed out: "Shota came to school to learn and not to sleep." All the more that this movement of the human heart of Amonashvili, gentle and paternal in ordinary life, in a television studio has the ring of a "method of the moment" and this has little in common with the noble, profound and ancient Georgian people's pedagogics.

But in addition to the old and new innovators, in the Academy there is a cohort of remarkable and honest scholars who find it impossible to work in this atmosphere. The atmosphere has been created by the press. There is the folk saying: "While the lords fiddle, the forelocks of the serfs crack." The forelocks crack most in children who suffer from this fuss.

The school at all times and in all healthy societies has always been a noble-conservative institution, like a protective conservative love for children. The school receives from society only the most intelligent, the most tested and the healthiest that is produced by the aggregate experience of generations. For this reason the school can never be revolutionary. The child is already intensely "revolutionary" in his development and growth. Wise restraint must be taught without extinguishing the creative strength in the child. Just as there never could be a school which was "ahead" in spite of UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA. A revolutionary school which is "ahead" of society is also a pathological phenomenon. To raise children who surpass their parents, to create students who are ahead and are more progressive than their teachers—this would be to create new Pavlik Morozovs, judges of their fathers, and create a split in generations. In this "outstripping development" the "intellectual resources" are put in first place and the "moral ones" in the second. Possibly they dream of producing tomorrow computer primates with a dislocated rock mentality. In order to be faithful to the freedom to the expression of will, let this handful of people somewhere in Varshavka or at Taganka, in Perekhino or some other place set up their own school which is "ahead," "revolutionary" and "rational" and thinking differently. On what grounds should this chimera be allowed to extend to the entire nation, and who has given the right again, after the anarchy of the 1920s, the benumbed years, in broad daylight and in the heart of the nation for a group of people to destroy, shake and

scuff at the ancient principles of education? And when will a limit be put to this destruction?

One other cornerstone principle of the school. In the West they have long felt that there is no more profitable investment of capital in the world than the investing into public education but with one obligatory rule: the school should always operate at a loss. The parents, in giving their children everything, are not concerned with recompense. A child which has grown up in the rays of unselfishness replies a hundred-fold. This is what a wise society does. And those who speak about child production, about school cost accounting, and about early labor education invest terrible destruction in the tomorrow of society.

At school children learn and that is their main labor.

It is only because our children were able to solve more difficult problems than American schoolchildren that we were the first to launch a satellite. This is not my opinion but rather the conclusion of American experts. The work of a school child should be only creative. A pupil should not work at a machine or on a conveyor belt where a dulling apathy for work is developed in him from childhood, but rather create even a small table, an aviation model, a pen case, a carting or a new frigate, but everything should be a first in the world and the sole copy. When there was the smell of war and the threat forced the nation to gird itself, the government had enough wisdom to order Makarenko to cease extolling child labor, moreover in captivity, without a history and a homeland. He was harshly told that the revolution had been made not for the children to work but rather to learn. Only for this reason were we able to create new tanks, motors, weapons and produce a new officer corps which instantly mastered this equipment. This is why "child industry," as the intellectual ignoramuses understand it, is "child oncology" for society. Both "revolutionariness," and "outstripping development," and the electing of teachers and children sitting on the pedagogical councils and "child industry," let us repeat, "more often than not leads inevitably to disaster, chaos, panic, the dividing of power and defeat."¹

Why do we need a Pushkin? In order to know whom we are raising. What sort of pupil we expect. Did Afghanistan help us make this clear? Undoubtedly, yes! And the main question of school as everywhere is one of personnel. What sort of teacher? Certainly honesty requires that we say today: "What sort of female teacher?" Who, according to Belinskiy, will "determine the fate" of the child and hence society? Can we maintain our self-respect knowing that we have placed the heaviest and most responsible undertaking in the nation—the educating of our children—on the shoulders of overfatigued women who have their own children at home? The pedagogue is the central figure in the school, as an officer is in the Army and Navy. The Academy of Pedagogical Sciences in terms of idea for the corps of teachers and the 50 million pupils is the same as the General Staff or the

Army. Can the Academy fulfill its role among the badgering and hooting? Does this bear on the army? More than directly.

Not so long ago, a group of leading instructors from the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze was invited to a meeting at a secondary school specializing in mathematics. The flower of Soviet officerhood has passed through this academy and at present it opens the parades on Red Square. It represents the army which sacrificed itself at Chernobyl, lost comrades for the Hindu Kush, built the BAM [Baykal-Amur Mainline] and whose humble service ensures the peaceful life and studies of the children.

The group of officers was headed by Gen K.M. Tsagolov and he invited me to participate in the conversation. When the half-dozen combat officers who knew not by hearsay what were bullets, an ambush, mines and death entered the large classroom of senior graders, not one of these students even stood up. Not only did they not stand up, but they were not even seated, but were provocatively sprawled about. And these were juveniles, almost children, who were seeing for the first time the visitors who were full of affection for them. Several women representing the school leadership were seated about, disinterested. The officers began an awkward and difficult attempt to start up a conversation with the pupils who did not want to learn anything, they were as if they were deaf, they were not even hostile and this required even some effort. No, the pupils giggled, they were slightly ironic and at times openly bored. The feeling of shame from that evening has clearly not left a single adult. They felt as if they were in an alien country.

Gen Tsagolov who could find a common tongue even with the dushman [Afghan rebels] could not establish contact with these children. Everything was silently directed by a nervous young teacher who was sitting behind the young boys. You could feel that he had "collaborated" with them for a long time. The air clearly in the school was stifling, nervous and full of intrigues which involved the "collaborating" young intellectuals. The children clearly felt that, being students in a special school, they should put these "uncles" in their place with intelligent questions. They flauntingly humiliated the guests.

It was time to stand up and say farewell politely. But still the awkwardness remained.... These were still children.... K.M. Tsagolov sincerely and ardently, almost showing them his army shirt, tried to persuade them that the officers before them were the same people as everyone. But he caught just the smirk of the director-teacher. Unhappy children. The pernicious spirit of omniscience and irony had already touched their unformed souls. All of this could have been forgiven if there would have been in them some youthful challenge, smartness and neatness in dress, the spice of intelligence in speech or awakening strengths. There was, on the contrary, among them and even among the girls, a certain sloppiness in clothing, a negligence, an overburdening with certain concerns and

a certain lack of restraint in stance reminiscent of old age. In a year or two, these poor snobs would be taken into the army.

At the same Academy imeni M.V. Frunze, the chief of the museum described the following incident. The military instructor of the 29th School which is in the area of Kropotkinskaya Street asked permission to visit the museum with the seniors. The academy chief, Col Gen V.N. Konchits, as an exception permitted these "civilians" to visit the museum. They were like kids from the school which he himself had completed. Now this was an English special school. The seniors drove the museum chief to complete distraction. While he was describing to them about the academy, they loitered about the museum, they laughed, interrupted him and directly stated to the museum head, a former officer who for 30 year bit by bit had been assembling the exhibits, that they found neither the academy nor the museum to their liking. Supposedly they did not intend to serve in the army. They would get into a VUZ by "pull" and then they could study abroad. But the troops were below their dignity.

We live in a time of creative perestroika and not a "Khrushchevian" one when they closed down not only scores of thousands of churches but also much was "restructured" to such a degree that the army and society were still having problems. One of these destructive reorganizations was the abolishing of numerous Suvorov schools and special schools which supplied the army with the best personnel. I feel that any military academy or school can scarcely carry out its role completely if they do not have a section for young boys, if there is no coming generation. The young boys are forced to straighten up and look at themselves from outside. I am confident that if there was an academy of Suvorov students, the officers at the meeting with the young whiz kids and their anxious "collaborator" would have been happier, more mocking and resourceful. The Suvorov schools break the enclosed caste system of the army. The small boys in shoulder boards are like a smile of the troops. A people's army should have its own favorites and the first selections should be in the children's homes. This is understood by Col Gen Vladimir Nikolayevich Konchits, the teacher of the teachers. He is in favor of a form of instruction of the young men which could be introduced immediately and which we, like much else, have unmeritedly forgotten. The general himself, after a 7-year school, completed Prechistenka in Moscow, a military school with the unsuccessful title of "special school." These special schools for the branches of arms prior to the war were the cherished dream of the young boys. The young boys entered them after a 7-year school. They wore a uniform with pride but lived with their families. This is something similar to the current institutions with the equally unsuccessful title of PTU [vocational-technical school]. We are second to none in the area of absurd names, titles and uniforms. And a uniform, according to Hegel, is the luminescence of essence and requires responsibility.

In the times of V.N. Konchits, an infatuation with imported goods would have immediately been halted by the juveniles and punished for betrayal of the colors. Clothing is a very serious matter. Here they need not designers but rather philosopher-artists. Only ignoramuses feel that the tsars were closely involved with the uniforms of their troops because they did not know what else to do with their time. When Alexander III neglected this for a time and somewhat, and let me emphasize somewhat, standardized and simplified the uniform of the officers, the response of the youth was an immediate and sharp decline in the admission to military institutions. The sons of Stalin, Mikoyan, Frunze and Kuybyshev studied with Konchits in the special artillery school. The children of the nation's leaders willingly went to military schools. They were difficult times but united ones. The Nazis chose a very bad time for themselves to attack us. At that time, the young boys preferred stadiums to guitars and parachutes to tape recorders. Once childhood began with harsh testing, you can be confident that these children would not have problems with their fathers. Harshness was repaid with gratitude and loyalty while indulgence was repaid by "treachery," that is, the boy unconsciously let it be known that in overfeeding him they had corrupted him and he would unconsciously seek vengeance for this. The then special schools were rather like military lycees. A number of the PTU even now could be shifted to the rank of military engineer lycees.

When, dropped into Afghanistan, the young men perished, our army for the first time in history was without friendly singers "about the camp of Russian soldiers." Let us recall that Pushkin rushed to Erzerum to the army in the field. Closely following the state of education in Russia, he wrote: "The Lancaster schools in our country are part of the system of military education and, consequently, are in the best order.... The cadet corps, the nursery of the Russian Army officers, require physical transformation and great surveillance of morals which are in the most rotten neglect.... Strict attention should be paid to the notes passing between the students. The severest punishment should be imposed for a discovered obscene note, expulsion from school for a scandalous one but without further persecution in service for to punish a young man or an adult for the sin of a lad is a terrible thing and, unfortunately, too common among us...."

It is no accident that these lines were penned by Pushkin as he is our contemporary, our mentor and the soul of creative perestroika.

He goes on to write as if he lived in our times: "Generally it should not be that republican ideas overwhelm the students when published and have for them the charm of newness (the poet has in mind the Decembrist officers.—K.R.). Russian history should be taught according to Karamzin. "Istoriya Gosudarstva Rossiyskogo" [The History of the Russian State] is not only the work of a

great writer but also the feat of an honest man. Russia is too little known to the Russians: there must be special departments for its history, statistics and legislation. The study of Russia should be predominantly the concern in final years of the minds of the young nobility preparing to serve the fatherland in faith and justice...."

Traditions are memory and memory is the air of culture, the soul of both the school, the army and the family. As far as I know, there has not been a single essay in the central press or a broadcast over television about Col G. V. Konchits. And there are thousands of men like Konchits in the nation and the army. It is they who should educate the young men and not the television shows. Without elevating and healthy examples, each day television intensifies the running wild of society and makes all of us orphans without kind, tribe, traditions and teachers. Why do the people not hear from Army Gen G.I. Salmanov, yet another teacher of the teachers, for, in addition to fighting the Nazis, he had to pass a difficult exam in Afghanistan and is now the chief of the Military Academy of the USSR General Staff, an institution of learning which is unique in the world.

Is it not bizarre that in the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences there are no people of the rank of Prof V. Konchits who all their life has been involved in the educating and training of pedagogue officers? How can the academy get by without the chief of the world's only Nakhimov School, Hero of the Soviet Union, Rear Adm Stolyarov? Or the representatives of the Suvorov Schools? Or Maj Gen Mikhaylov, the leader of the world's finest band and military music school?

Is it not comic that actors the representatives of the most stagnant area of culture² have rushed in to save education? Or the theater workers have nothing to do in their sphere? Possibly they are operating according to the old principle of "the unknowing teaches"? Why in the most important area of the nation we also do not hear the voices of the combat Gen V. Slyusar, Hero of the Soviet Union and chief of the Higher Military Airborne School in Ryazan? This institution of learning is currently the most popular with the youth. It has long set all records for applications per place. Last year, there were 26 for each place. Even Suvorov graduates and medal winners were eliminated. The boys who did not pass the competition, they say, dig dugouts on the edge of the forest outside of town and wait hoping for a miracle vacancy. This sociopsychological feat of enormous strength has been looked at askance by our silly television. The arrow again pointed toward health and patriotism. Why do we not hear the voice of Adm Yegor Tomko, Hero of the Soviet Union and chief of the Leningrad Higher Naval Submarine School? How long will we, in crawling away, not stop one thing but won't allow the other to happen? Democracy requires greater will and reason than any other system and not indulgence for decadence.

Why do television and the newspapers encourage not those who unite us in the nation but rather what dis-unites, separates and splits apart? Can creative perestroika be victorious if we do not establish a special public committee for supervising television? Why in England have healthy forces been found to establish a committee which mercilessly edits out all scenes of porno and violence while we are just getting around to such problems at the height of the AIDS epidemic? There will be no end to the savagry, orphanhood, drunkenness and mismanagement until conscience is put in first place and then education, until amusements are swept out of all schools and the first state step and the most important one would be a fundamental restructuring of television, the most stagnant, inept and uncultured structure in our society. In the world there is no other state with such a pathological situation. On the screen facing the entire nation should be the representatives who at the price of their life defend the state and, together with the leadership of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences with the involvement of the public, must provide a new direction for education.

Children go home from school. Soldiers hurry home from the army. In the evening persons hurry from the plants and factories, the fields and institutions to the warm hearth at home, to the family. Both the school, the armed forces and the state are based on the family. After meekly cramming into transport, frenzied rushing about through stores, after the alienated crowd of fellow citizens and the humiliating sales personnel, we make our way home. But here quiet does not await us. The newspapers, the TV screen and radio are full of discontent, ambiguous revelations, the hurried build-up of problems, rash judgments, unchallengeable advice, the estimates of the noble writers and all of this against a background of pseudorevolutions be it "sexual," "scientific," "green," "technical" and a good score of others. Although there is no trace of any revolutions. There is gradual development of technologies. Since the time of stagnation there has been in circulation certain phrases such as "more rapid development" or "labor education" ("education by labor," possibly) but "labor education" is a non-Russian absurdity like "pedagogics of collaboration" or "park of culture." Later these phrases creep unnoticed into the speech of officials and acquire a canonical nomenclature. Thus, the press becomes the main factory of bureaucratic slang which pollutes awareness and intensifies confusion and panic in society.

In the West this rush, noise and decibels are needed to sell a good accompanied by a hullabaloo. In aware perestroika, why do we need this worked-up tone, this obscure flow of half-truths in bad Russian and who is supporting it under the pretext of glasnost? The main foundations of the state—the family, school and army—have come under particularly destructive attack. The noblest human qualities can by constant urging be reduced to their opposite. The old Russian consciousness and self-criticism, in overdoing it, can degenerate in some into gloomy dissatisfaction with oneself, in others

to a torturous digging at oneself and in still others, having taken to the bottle, be reduced to what Kant termed "voluptuous self-defilement." Unnoticed this becomes the dominant mood of society and literature.

Writers are digging into the souls of traitors, the police and deserters. In the foreground are not the creators but rather the eternally dissatisfied failures. There is a terrible moral danger that the repressions of previous years become reading matter. The authors are competing in giving the stunning figures of persons shot in the back of the head. Grief and tragedy have become similar to a narcotic injection. In a society which cannot boast of a spiritual life against the background of headless churches and poisoned soil, this assumes a malevolent cast. We have filled the pages with the subjects of violence but we must raise children, plant oak groves, clean up the rivers, rethink our historical past, strengthen the army and build new schools, lycees, swimming pools and roads.

While criticizing Troskyism and Stalinism, and without noticing whether we would wish or not, we have become infatuated with the propagandizing of violence. And nearby are unprotected school children and students without political immunity. They must grow up, grow strong and believe. In such an atmosphere it is impossible to raise children, to work or to serve the fatherland. Who has the right to write about the repressions without a public, profound and complete investigation by experts? On what grounds do they bemoan some and remain silent about others? Such an approach to the people's tragedy is fraught with an unbridling of vicious motives. Let a special committee not overlook a single suffering soul, let them publish volume after volume of the tragic martyrdom of our land, let them publish the lists of the founders of the Gulag, let the party assume control of this, but let us stop the bacchanalia in the periodicals, for the splashing of everything in the press without a thorough investigation is a violation of human and legal standards. We must build a new life but our children are not allowed to extricate themselves from the bloody pits of the Gulag.

Loyalty to sacred traditions is the most innovative and creative force in the world and for this reason in a time of an hysterical bacchanalia over the schools, in defense of childhood, the family, the army and the state, one would like to sum up what was said in the words of the Polish poet Neimcewicz and were so beloved of K. Ryleyev that he reworked them in his own "thoughts": "Remind the youth of the deeds of our ancestors and let him know of the glorious epochs of the people, to win love for the fatherland by the very first impressions of memory—all of this is the best method of arousing strong affection for the motherland in the people. Then nothing is capable of suppressing those first impressions, those early concepts and they grow stronger over the years preparing brave soldiers for war and wise men for council."

...Every day I walk past the school which Col Gen V.N. Konchits completed some time ago. In front of the

school, are carved stone images of young men in uniform, boys who fell in the war and were graduates of the special artillery school. The secondary school at one time was visited by Reagan's wife during the visit of the American president. Here on the 1st of September, the corresponding member of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, the writer A. Aleksin, likes to open the academic year. Here on the parade grounds, in plain view of the scores of parents walking behind first-year students, were female seniors smoking. They look as though they had just emerged from the pedagogical council where they were settling the problems of education with the teachers. Even last year, this was not the case. UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA and its patrons can congratulate themselves as the "pedagogics of familiarity" is gaining strength. One might even include these girls as members of the editorial board of UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA in order to be faithful to the logic of events.

I recall during the summer in Sevastopol, the commander of one of our best naval ships, a man who is sincerely concerned for the navy, said that he would very much like to restore the noble traditions of the senior wardrooms and the officer assemblies with their democracy, military fraternity and military culture. But one major circumstance prevented him. He was not confident that after the very first meeting a number of officers would begin to address him informally and slap him on the back. It is a question of the relationships within the officer environment and not between the seamen and their commanders. The fears of the commander are very serious. Democratization without the ongoing indoctrination of a feeling of distance, that is, dignity, is a chimera which leads to the loss of both the ship and the school which also has its crew.

Would not the reign of familiarity in the school and the destruction of its principles lead to a more dangerous situation than Karabakh, for it is a question of the fate of 50 million school children and involves all the nation's families. Is this realized by those who senselessly argue for the new extreme? Possibly we have had enough shying from grim officialdom to lax collaboration and perhaps it is time to return to the inestimable treasures of our own heritage and pass these riches on to the legitimate heirs, the children?

Tomorrow a group of "innovators" at a newspaper or magazine will establish a "commission" of very respected academicians, actors and writers and in urging the "friends" of the newspaper to support the "policy of collaboration," will begin to persuade everyone that we are already mature enough for the democratic elections of the secretaries of the party Central Committee. If a model has been established for the elections of even the academicians, then the next step comes automatically. All of this ultimately, let us repeat again, "leads inevitably to disaster, chaos, panic, the dividing of power and defeat."

Let them shout and stew over perestroyka, but leave the school and the army in peace. I am aware that there are

very many good people who invest fond feelings into the words "pedagogics of collaboration." However, education requires responsibility in addition to feelings. The readers may gain the impression that the author is incorrectly merging the idea of army and school. No, the difference between them is obvious, but with the departmental alienation it is useful to recall what brings us together, for if the army and the people are united, then the school is that portion of the people which the army protects above all. These two institutions in society are to be approached not by hire and election but rather out of civil duty and obligation. Let them hold meetings and elect in a different place. Incidentally, even there they should first do some work and then elect. Otherwise the most democratic of us will be far from the most industrious. We must return respect for knowledge and inquisitiveness. In the past in our nation and at present in all countries the heads of state continuously and effectively intervene in the life of the schools, VUZes and academies. The president personally awards the best school-children at the White House. But we have made our children the hostages of the dilettantes from pedagogics and the object of irresponsible experiments.

Where are we going and who will "determine the fate" of our children? The party has set out for spiritual renewal and creation. Too many today pay honor to the name of perestroyka but are pursuing group aims. Some fear the rebirth of Stalinism and their opponents are equally concerned by the covert rehabilitation of Trotskyism. But there is no historical future either for OGONEK and UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA as well as for their extreme opponents. Both the bureaucratic harsh soullessness of Stalinism as well as the hurried anxiety of the pedagogics of permissiveness are unviable as they are deprived of vital growth and roots.

We need not a show program but rather a plan designed for the extended catching of our breath on the threshold of the new millennium. Only extensive humanization of life and profound humanitarianization of education can become the basis for new movement in social life and pedagogics.

* * *

I would assume that this article would not be accepted by everyone. But since glasnost does not mean to wail but rather presupposes a dialogue and politeness and not the hysterically hurried "there is no other way," the time has come to learn and listen and, if need be, to parry a different opinion. The time has come to put aside the tarred brush so favored by many.

I will assume the boldness to assert that in no other democracy has there been an instance when they belittled and humiliated a woman who dared to openly voice her opinion and without allowing her to reply. Nina Andreyeva personally signed a letter and suffered personal moral harm, no matter how ambiguously one may allude to her inspirers. It is dangerous to depict such a "model of democracy" as innovation.

I do not agree with a single idea in the article of Nina Andreyeva, although I am not convinced that she longs for Stalinism. Nor do I share the longings of Yuriy Afanasyev who dreamingly surveys Trotsky's office in Smolny. The historical time of both the Stalinists and the Trotskyites is finished. No verbal tricks will conceal the political vulgarity of their motives. The time of creation has arrived. Those who do not agree with the ideas in this article I invite to an open discussion initially in the press and later on television. Certainly, anybody could be an opponent. Possibly Academician Sakharov will take up the pen or Yu. Afanasyev will take off time from educating the students? Who of the bards of pluralism is ready for an honest discussion of the main problems of the school, the family, army and society?

(To Be Continued)

Footnotes

1. V.I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 40, p 240.

2. The theater in 1987 lost 3 million spectators (from the newspapers).

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SOVIET MILITARY ART

Consequences of Estimates

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[Article by Col V.N. Kiselev, candidate of military sciences, docent and Col N.M. Ramanichev, candidate of historical sciences, docent: "The Consequences of Estimates (The Actions of the Southern Front in the Initial Period of the Great Patriotic War)"]

[Text] The actions of the Soviet troops on the southern sector had certain particular features. These were determined by a number of factors. In the first place, the field headquarters of the Southern Front was established in the course of the commenced war and, secondly, the enemy here went over to the offensive with its main forces much later than on the other sectors. The article published within the context of the ongoing discussion over the questions of the initial period of the war is aimed at bringing out these particular features.

By June 1941, the state frontier between the USSR and Romania was covered by formations of the Odessa Military District (commander, Col Gen Ya.T. Cherevichenko) and the Border Troops of the Moldavian Border District (chief, Maj Gen N.N. Nikolskiy). Cooperating with them was the Danube Naval Flotilla under the command of Rear Adm N.O. Abramov. The district included the IX Special, XXXV, XIV, XLVIII and VII Rifle Corps, the II Cavalry Corps, the II and XVIII Mechanized Corps, the 150th and 116th Rifle Divisions, two fortified areas [UR] (80th and 82d) as well as three air divisions. According to

the mobilization plan, the district with the outbreak of war was to assign a portion of the forces to constitute the Field Headquarters of the 9th Army and this would include all the formations with the exception of the IX Special Corps stationed in the Crimea and the VII Corps located in the reserve of the High Command. The army was to be deployed along the Prut and Danube Rivers in a zone of 480 km from Lipkany to the Black Sea (see the diagram).

The district troops were opposed by the 11th German, the 3d and 4th Romanian Armies which made up Army Group South. According to the Barbarossa Plan, this group was to defend along the Prut, supporting the southern flank of the main forces of the army group launching the main thrust on the Kiev axis. Subsequently, the German-Romanian formations were to advance impeding the "organized retreat of the Soviet troops behind the Dniester."¹

In accord with the plan of the commander of Army Group South, Field Mar K. Rundstedt, the troops in Romania, while on the defensive, were to be ready to act according to two different plans. If the Soviet troops began to retreat, there was to be Operation Nachstoss in the aim of pursuing the latter and preventing their planned retreat behind the Dniester. Operation Munchen was planned in the event that the Soviet troops held the line along the Prut and the need arose to breach the defense. The 11th Army with the Romanian formations subordinate to it was to cross the Prut in its headwaters and advance to the northeast on the general axis of Mogilev-Podolskiy, Vinnitsa for linking up with the grouping launching the main thrust.²

In formal terms, all the troops stationed on Romanian territory were subordinate to the Romanian dictator I. Antonescu. Actually planning their combat was the concern of the Commander of the 11th Army, Col Gen Ritter von Schobert, whom Antonescu had instructed to work out "all directives and orders concerning the joint conduct of the war."³

The quantity and ratio of the main forces of the opposing sides by the start of the war can be characterized by the data shown in the table.

Ratio of Forces in Zone of 9th Army on 22 June 1941*

Name of Forces	Number of Forces		Ratio
	Soviet Troops	Enemy Troops	
Personnel (thousand men)	325.7	500	1:1.5
Guns and mortars	5,554	6,000	1:1.1
Tanks	769	60	12.8:1
Aircraft	1,216	600	2:1

* TsAMO [Central Archives of Ministry of Defense], folio 38, inv. 11360, file 5, sheet 35.

As is seen from the table, the enemy surpassed the district troops in terms of personnel. However, a larger portion (67 percent) was made up of Romanian troops who did not have fighting experience. The superiority in aviation and particularly in tanks made it possible for




Diagram of Combat Actions of Southern Front
(1-10 July 1941)

Key:

- 1—Position by end of 1 July
- 2—Position by end of 10 July
- 3—Fortified areas (UR)
- 4—Mountain-rifle corps (Romanian)
- 5—Cavalry corps (Romanian)
- 6—Army corps (German)

the Soviet formations to repulse the aggressor's offensive. At the same time, it must be pointed out that the constituting of the mechanized corps had not been completed and the main portion of the tanks and aircraft was of obsolete makes. The district had just 60 KV and T-34 tanks and 222 then-modern aircraft.

On 14 June, in line with the increased threat of attack, the Odessa Military District received instructions on the assigning of the 9th Army Headquarters (commander, Col Gen Ya.T. Cherevichenko) with the moving of it up to Tiraspol. In the morning of 20 June, the headquarters (chief of staff, Maj Gen M.V. Zakharov) was alerted and

under the guise of command-staff exercises by the end of the day had set up a command post in an area previously organized for the eventuality of war, having established contact with the formations to be included in the army.⁴

During the night of 22 June, the chief of staff received a message from the district commander who had remained still in Odessa that a telegram of particular urgency was expected from Moscow. Gen M.V. Zakharov summoned to the telegraphs the commanders of the rifle and cavalry corps and with permission from the commander ordered the cover units to take up their defensive areas.⁵ As was written in the combat log of the 9th Army, "at 2400 hours on 21 June 1941, the army units covering the frontier by telegraph order were alerted. Orders were given to occupy the areas according to the cover plan."⁶

The directive from the people's commissar of defense on alerting the troops to repel aggression was received by the Odessa Military District after the announcing of the combat alert. The army commander and military council member, corps commissar A.F. Kolobyakov arrived at the command post at 0900 hours on 22 June.

By 0400 hours, a majority of units from the 176th, 95th, 25th and 51st Rifle Divisions as well as the 9th Cavalry Division from the first echelon of the XXXV and XIV Rifle Corps and the II Cavalry Corps occupied the defenses prepared in engineer terms along the Prut. As an average per division there was about 100 km of frontier sector. Since the formations occupied the defenses in a zone 50-60 km wide, intervals remained between them. There was a particularly large gap between the 176th and 95th Rifle Divisions of over 70 km. The spaces were covered only by border troop forces.⁷

Along the Dniester on the old (1940) state frontier were the 80th and 82d Fortified Areas (UR). They had defensive structures almost along the entire area of the district to a depth of 4-6 km. Thus, the 82d UR, in defending a front of 150 km, had 262 machine gun emplacements and 22 artillery ones, it numbered over 10,000 men, around 100 guns, 632 medium and 285 light machine guns as well as other weapons.⁸

On 22 June, the enemy with "shock-search groups" made up of Romanian formations endeavored to seize the bridges and bridgeheads and create the appearance of a general offensive. Using the gaps in the defenses of the Soviet troops, enemy subunits were able to capture small bridgeheads at Branesti, Skulyany, Ungeny and Valeny.⁹ However, even by the end of the day, the bridgeheads had been eliminated by a counterattack from the assigned subunits. Only in the Skulyany area was it not possible to push the enemy back beyond the Prut. For eliminating it, the commander of the 30th Mountain Rifle Division (commander, Maj Gen S.G. Galaktionov) undertook a counterattack but was unsuccessful. On other sectors the repeated attempts by Romanian troops to capture the crossings and bridgeheads in June were repulsed.

Simultaneously with the conduct of the defensive, there was the mobilizing of the formations and units of the 9th Army. The bringing up to strength with personnel was basically carried out drawing on the local population. Instead of the 2 or 3 days according to the plan, bringing up to strength took around a week. The delays were caused basically by the disorganization in assembling the recruits and by the shortage of motor transport to carry them. Regardless of the shortcomings and difficulties, it was possible to fully provide the formations with personnel. The situation was different with motor transport and tractors which according to the mobilization plan should have arrived not only from the Odessa but also other districts. Due to the poor organization of the receiving and distributing of the vehicles by the military commissariats as well as by the appropriate district and army services they were not at TOE strength. Moreover, the enemy by air strikes disrupted railroad operations. As a result of the great shortage of vehicles and tractors, serious difficulties arose with the delivery of materiel and the towing of artillery. Because of the lack of necessary supplies, the troops remained under strength in terms of communications equipment. There were not enough radios. The mechanized corps were greatly under strength in tanks. The strongest II Mechanized Corps (commander, Lt Gen Yu.F. Novoselskiy) was only at 50 percent of strength, while the XVIII (commander, Maj Gen Tank Trps P.V. Volokh) was just 27 percent¹⁰; here in its 47th Tank Division (commander, Col G.S. Rodin) there were no tanks at all.

The importance of the operational sector, the broad defensive zone of the 9th Army as well as the necessity of pooling the efforts of the troops stationed in the Crimea required a change in the command of the troops on the southern sector. The Command of the Odessa Military District repeatedly raised this question. The last time the military council on 20 June 1941 forwarded to the USSR people's commissar of defense a special report which established the advisability of creating not an army but rather a front headquarters on the basis of the district.¹¹

On 21 June, the Politburo of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee decided to form the Southern Front. The constituting of the headquarters was assigned to the Staff of the Moscow Military District. The district commander, Army Gen I.V. Tyulenev, who was to be responsible for the command of the front, was notified about this early in the morning of 22 June. On 24 June, the front headquarters arrived in Vinnitsa, where, upon instructions from Headquarters, it established a command post. Its location in this area (in the zone of the Southwestern Front) impeded communications with the troops and was caused by the fact that even in 1939-1940 here they had established a front command post. As I.V. Tyulenev recalled, "neither the General Staff nor the Staff of the Kiev Military District" informed him of the existence of the post. Ivan Vladimirovich [Tyulenev] learned of it

from the chief of the front's engineer troops.¹² Here there were no means of communications and the staff had to use the local ones.

The front as of 25 June included the 9th and 18th Armies, the IX Special, LV and VII Rifle Corps and other units subordinate to the front. The front's Air Forces consisted of five air divisions which were incorporated in the armies. Remaining at the disposal of the front were just two fighter air regiments and one air reconnaissance regiment. The Headquarters of the 18th Army (commander, Lt Gen A.K. Smirnov) was set up on the basis of the Staff of the Kharkov Military District with the incorporating in the army of the XVII Rifle Corps (commander, Maj Gen I.V. Galanin) and the XVI Mechanized Corps (commander, Div Cmdr A.D. Sokolov) of the Southwestern Front. The army staff arrived at its destination only on 26 June, it set up the command post on the following day and began to control and command the formations.¹³ "The task of the Southern Front armies," stated the first directive from the front of 25 June, "is to defend the state frontier with Romania. In the event that the enemy crosses or overflies our territory, it is to be destroyed by active operations of the ground troops and aviation and they are to be ready for decisive offensive actions."¹⁴

The front had 15 rifle divisions, 3 cavalry, 6 tank and 3 motorized divisions¹⁵ and defended a zone around 700 km wide from the Carpathians to the mouth of the Danube and the Black Seacoast.¹⁶ Under it in operational terms were the Danube Naval Flotilla, the Odessa Naval Base and the border detachments of the NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs]. The front's troops were opposed by 7 German and 13 Romanian infantry divisions, 9 Romanian brigades, including 1 tank brigade.¹⁷

The commander of Army Group South, in considering the generally successful action on the main sector and the position of the Soviet troops on the Prut, on 24 June issued an order to the grouping in Romania to prepare for Operation Munchen. By 2 July, the grouping was to occupy the forming-up place and in the morning begin an offensive in the aim of breaching the defenses of the Southern Front. At the same time, Field Mar Rundstedt was still not completely confident of the success of the operations and this was reflected in the order to the 11th Army of 25 June. This stated that the formations assigned for the offensive by 1 July should be in areas where they "could remain for many days...."¹⁸

The enemy assault grouping was comprised of the 11th Army and a Romanian cavalry corps and these had the task of advancing in the zone from Tsutsor to Badrazh and breaching the defenses on two sectors. The main thrust was launched by the LIV and XXX Army Corps on the axis of Iasi, Beltsy, and a second strike by a German and a Romanian cavalry corps from the area of Stefanesti to Mogilev-Podolskiy. Subsequently, both groupings were to operate on the general axis of Vinnitsa for linking up with the 17th Army advancing from the

Lvov area. The main forces of the 3d Romanian Army which had been put under the commander of the 11th Army by the defensive was to support the deployment and flanks of the offensive groupings. The 4th Romanian Army, in remaining under the national command, with the start of the operation by fire and feint attacks, particularly strong on the Kishinev axis, were to tie down the Soviet troops to the south of the zone of advance.¹⁹

The Command of the Southern Front was unable to discover the axis of the main thrust. The intelligence summary from the front's staff of 2 July stated that the main enemy forces consisting of 9-10 divisions, including 5-6 tank and motorized, were concentrated in the Stefanesti area.²⁰ Actually, there were located 5 infantry divisions and 5 brigades, including 1 tank brigade with 60 tanks.²¹ Intelligence from the front assumed the presence of 900-960 tanks in the assault grouping.²²

As a result of such an assessment of the situation, the strongest and most deeply echeloned troop grouping of the front was established in the zone of the 18th Army on the Kamenets-Podolskiy axis. Here were 6 rifle divisions and the XVI Mechanized Corps. On the sector of the enemy thrusts, on the right flank of the 9th Army, there remained 2 rifle divisions in the first echelon. Six infantry divisions and 2 cavalry brigades were deployed against them just in the first echelon.

From the morning of 2 July, the aggressor went over to the offensive, having attacked the right-flank formations of the 9th Army. Advancing as the main assault grouping from the Iasi area were 2 German and 2 Romanian divisions against the boundary between the 30th Mountain Rifle and 95th Rifle Divisions. Two German infantry divisions and 2 Romanian cavalry brigades attacked in the defensive zone of the 176th Rifle Division. The enemy concentrated its main forces on narrow sectors. Thus, the thrust of the two infantry divisions and the cavalry brigade came against the single 404th Rifle Regiment of the 176th Division. Regardless of the stubborn resistance by the formations of the 9th Army, the numerically superior Nazi troops crossed the Prut and by the end of the day had advanced up to 8-10 km in depth.

In line with the pullback of troops on the left wing of the Southwestern Front, Headquarters gave the Southern Front the task of pulling back the formations of the 18th Army to the line of Smotrich, Lipkany. Considering the axis of advance of the assault groupings and in carrying out the instructions from Headquarters, Army Gen I.V. Tyulenev reinforced the right wing of the front, shifting the XVIII Mechanized Corps there and deploying the reserve 189th Rifle Division. The XVI Mechanized Corps from around Chernovtsy was pulled back to the fortified areas along the old state frontier. The commander of the 9th Army moved the II Mechanized Corps up to the threatened sector. However, while the concentration of the forces was going on, the enemy from 3 through 4 July advanced up to 40 km in depth.

The 9th Army endeavored by a counterstrike of the II Mechanized Corps together with the 74th Rifle Division (commander, Col F.Ye. Sheverdin) to halt and destroy the enemy grouping advancing on Beltsy²³ but they were unsuccessful. On 5 July, the front commander decided to pull back the 18th and 9th Armies behind the Dniester to the positions of the fortified areas. For the defense of Odessa they proposed establishing a group of forces consisting of 3 rifle divisions and headed by the deputy front commander, Lt Gen N.Ye. Chibisov. In taking such a decision, I.V. Tyulenev assumed that up to 40 infantry and 13 tank and motorized divisions were operating ahead of the front.²⁴ In actuality, there was half the number of infantry formations and no tank and motorized ones at all.

Proceeding from his conceptions, the front commander on 5 July reported to I.V. Stalin, S.K. Timoshenko and G.K. Zhukov that the front had an opportunity to conduct combat only "by the method of a mobile defense relying on the UR's on the Dniester."²⁵ On the following day, I.V. Tyulenev issued orders to the troops to retreat and they began to carry out the set tasks. However, Headquarters did not approve his decision as excessively passive and not corresponding to the situation. By the Directive from Headquarters of 7 July, the front was ordered, using a counterstrike of reserves which were to be established from units taken from unattacked sectors, to push the enemy back behind the Prut and then employ the territory of Bessarabia and as an initial staging area for an offensive.²⁶ Permission was given to pull back only the 18th Army, having the XVII Rifle Corps occupy the defenses along the southern bank of the Dniester from the 12th UR to Khotin and then to Lipkany. Headquarters did not argue either against establishing a troop group for the defense of the Odessa sector.

The Southern Front began to carry out the task set by Headquarters of destroying the enemy which had broken through. It must be pointed out that the front had a limited capability of launching a counterstrike by this time. The transfer by the front to the adjacent Southwestern Front, in addition to the VII Rifle Corps, of the XVI and XVIII Mechanized Corps, the 196th and 227th Rifle Divisions and the 4th Antitank Artillery Brigade impeded the creation of a counterstrike grouping and the carrying out of the task of restoring the defenses along the Prut.

Particular difficulties arose in the 9th Army the commander of which had already issued orders to have the formations pull back behind the Dniester.²⁷ The commenced pullback further complicated the conditions of launching the counterstrike. Regardless of this, the XLVIII Rifle Corps (commander, Maj Gen R.Ya. Malinovskiy), the II Mechanized and II Cavalry Corps (commander, Maj Gen P.A. Belov) from the morning of 8 July began to counterattack the enemy. The counterstrike was launched against the boundary of the 4th Romanian and 11th German Armies and continued 9 and 10 July. As a result, the offensive of the 11th Army

and the 4th Romanian Army which had begun to pursue the formations of the XXXV Rifle Corps was halted.

The commander of the 11th Army, Gen Schobert, requested permission for the formations to be given a lull in the offensive for replenishing losses. Having given approval, the commander of Army Group South ordered that the LIV Army Corps be sent to aid the 4th Romanian Army which was endeavoring to capture Kishinev. On 10 July, the Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces reported to Field Mar Keitel that the chances of the 11th Army for success were insignificant and that it would not be able to resume the offensive before 16 July.²⁸

The situation on the Southern Front was temporarily stabilized. The formations of the 18th Army pulled back to the line of the Mogilev-Yampolskiy UR and took up a strong defense. The 9th Army dug in 40-50 km to the west of the Dniester while formations of its second echelon occupied the Rybnitsa UR. The permanent structures of the fortified areas along the left bank of the Dniester comprised the basis of the engineer organization of the army defenses. The divisions of the Maritime Troop Group were defending as before along the frontier on the Prut and Danube Rivers. The sailors of the Danube Naval Flotilla fought courageously together with these formations. All attempts by the enemy to cross the Danube were repulsed by the joint efforts of the men of the 9th Army and the sailors.

The Danube Flotilla operated actively. It achieved supremacy on the lower courses of the river, having repulsed all attempts by the Romanian Danube River Division to break through downstream. By 26 June, the flotilla together with the 79th Border Detachment captured the Satul Nou Peninsula and landed on the right bank of the Danube subunits from the 287th Rifle Regiment of the 51st Rifle Division (commander, Maj Gen P.G. Tsurulnikov). As a result, both banks of the northern branch of the Danube from Izmail to Vilkoovo was in the hands of the Soviet troops.

Thus ended the first defensive operation of the Southern Front in the course of the war. Its troops on the axis of the enemy thrusts in Moldavia by the end of 10 July had retreated 60-80 km. Moreover, upon orders from Headquarters they were to leave the territory of the Western Ukraine on the boundary with the Southwestern Front. By this time, the Southern Front which was to defend a zone 500 km wide had just 20 divisions, largely ones bled white.²⁹ The weakening of the front's forces was a consequence not so much of combat losses as the transfer of a significant portion of the troops to the Southwestern Front.

In analyzing the combat of the Southern Front, it must be said that its creation was an essential but delayed decision of the Supreme High Command. Only the passive enemy actions on the Soviet-Romanian frontier made it possible to carry out this task, as a whole, successfully. However, the formation of the new front

headquarters on the basis of the staff from the Moscow Military District required a move which took 3 days and the arriving command and staff did not know either in what state the subordinate troops were or the theater of operations. All of this told negatively on the actions of the front during the first days of the war.

The course of the fighting on the southern sector to a significant degree was determined by the development of events on the Southwestern Front, where Army Group South had launched the main thrust. The deep breakthrough of the group on the Kiev axis threatened the rear of the Southern Front and this forced holding significant forces on the right wing, in the direction of the advance of the main assault grouping. As a result, only the 9th Army repulsed the enemy thrusts.

Combat practice showed that in the Southern Front during the period of its establishment, it was not advisable to include a portion of the troops of the Southwestern Front (with the exception of formations from the first echelon). This led to a weakening of the latter precisely at a time when the main events were occurring in its zone as well as to the actual idleness of the transferred troops.

Subsequently, up to 10 July, the Southern Front turned over to the Southwestern double the number of formations.

The low effectiveness of operations by the Southern Front to a significant degree was caused by the errors of intelligence in determining the composition, number and grouping of enemy troops. The incorrect assessment of enemy forces did not make it possible to take decisions corresponding to the situational conditions to organize a stable defense and rout the aggressor grouping which had broken through. At the same time, the desire of the commander to pull back the troops from the Prut to the line of fortified areas along the Dniester would have significantly strengthened the defensive capabilities of the Soviet troops.

Regardless of the shortcomings in the actions of the front, the enemy assault groupings advanced at a pace of 7-9 km a day. This was a consequence of the great activeness of the front's forces. The commanders endeavored to eliminate each breakthrough by counterattacks and counterstrikes and they widely maneuvered the forces both along the front and from in depth. The retreat of the troops to the new lines was organized. The commanders and their staffs succeeded in maintaining dependable command over the subordinate troops making it possible in an organized manner to maneuver the forces both in creating the counterstrike groupings and in the retreat.

Footnotes

1. "Sovershenno sekretno! Tolko dlya komandovaniya!" [Top Secret! For Command Eyes Only!], Moscow, Nauka, 1967, p 162.

2. "Sbornik voyenno-istoricheskikh materialov Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny" [Collection of Military-History Materials From the Great Patriotic War], Moscow, Voenizdat, No 18, 1960, pp 171-176.

3. Ibid., p 171.

4. "Odesskiy Krasnoznamenny" [The Odessa Red Banner Military District], Kishinev, Kartya Moldovenyaske, 1985, p 74.

5. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 6, 1974, p 94.

6. TsAMO [Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense], folio 464, inv. 5689, file 9, sheet 1.

7. In the zone of the 9th Army, the frontier was guarded by outposts of the 23d, 24th, 2d, 25th and 79th Border Detachments.

8. TsAMO, folio 138, inv. 7162, file 1, sheets 1, 17.

9. Ibid., folio 464, inv. 5689, file 9, sheet 2.

10. Ibid. folio 38, inv. 11360, file 5, sheet 35.

11. Ibid., folio 138, inv. 7162, file 13, sheets 1-8.

12. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 3, 1960, p 28.

13. TsAMO, folio 228, inv. 701, file 228, sheet 81; folio 371, inv. 4757, file 1, sheet 3.

14. Ibid., folio 371, inv. 2535, file 30, sheet 55.

15. Ibid., sheets 54-55.

16. Including two rifle divisions and one cavalry division in the Crimea. Not counted are four divisions of the VII Rifle Corps which soon thereafter became part of the Southwestern Front. In addition to this, the Southern Front included four URs (10th, 12th, 80th and 82d).

17. "Sbornik materialov po sostavu, gruppirovke i peregruppirovke sukhoputnykh voysk fashistskoy Germanii i voysk byvshikh yeye satellitov na sovetkogermanskom fronte za period 1941-1945 gg." [Collection of Materials on the Composition, Grouping and Regrouping of the Ground Forces of Nazi Germany and the Troops of Its Former Satellites on the Soviet-German Front Over the Period 1941-1945], Moscow, Izd. VNU GSh, No 1, 1955, p 12.

18. "Sbornik voyenno-istoricheskikh...", No 18, p 224.

19. Ibid., pp 174, 226.

20. TsAMO, folio 228, inv. 223098, file 3, sheet 37.

21. Ibid., folio 500, inv. 119, map.

22. Ibid., folio 228, inv. 701, file 56, sheet 5.

23. Ibid., file 228, sheet 101.

24. Ibid., file 58, sheets 11-12.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid., folio 48-A, inv. 1554, file 91, sheet 15.
27. Ibid., folio 5871, inv. 7161, file 1, sheet 17. The directive of the front for the counterstrike was issued in the evening while the order for the army to retreat came in the morning of 7 July.
28. F. Halder, "Voyennyy dnevnik" [War Diary], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 3, 1971, pp 114-115.
29. TsAMO, folio 228, inv. 701, file 56, sheet 19-20.
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FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE USSR MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

First Days of War in Documents

18011008C VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL
in Russian No 7, Jul 89 (signed to press 14 Jul 89
pp 22-34

[Documents prepared by Col V.R. Zhuravlev, Capt A.S. Anufriyev and N.M. Yemelyanova: "The First Days of the War in Documents"; the documents are the continuation of a series, for the earlier installments see VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, Nos 5, 6, 1989]

[Text]

POLITICAL REPORT FROM THE POLITICAL PROPAGANDA DIRECTORATE OF THE NORTHWESTERN FRONT TO THE MAIN POLITICAL PROPAGANDA DIRECTORATE OF THE RED ARMY

23 June 1941

The troops of the Northwestern Front are conducting stubborn fighting, checking the fierce enemy advance. The hate of the personnel for the enemies has been confirmed by numerous instances of the manifestation of courage and valor.

Jr Sgt Trofimov, weapon commander from the 8th Battery of the 459th Howitzer Artillery Regiment of the 125th Rifle Division repeated the combat feat of the artilleryman, Hero of the Soviet Union, Comrade Laptev.

In a situation where the battery was surrounded by the enemy and the gun crew was out of commission, Trofimov led three wounded comrades from his gun to shelter and then alone coolly fired at the enemy with direct laying. When resistance became useless, the enemy tanks were almost at the firing position, Trofimov blew up the gun and himself was able to break out of the enemy encirclement.

Red Armyman Vorontsov, a signalman from the 1st Battery of the 459th Howitzer Artillery Regiment of the 125th Rifle Division, under fierce enemy artillery shelling, courageously carried out the commander's assignment to repair damage on the communications line.

Our units are fiercely fighting the enemy. The enemy has been able to advance only as a result of a preponderance of forces. Individual units, being surrounded by the enemy, continued to fight stubbornly and then skillfully broke out of the encirclement.

The 204th Rifle Regiment of the 10th Rifle Division on 22 June in the Kuley area was surrounded, but by a bold, energetic strike it broke through the enemy ring and emerged from encirclement, having kept all the materiel.

The commander of the 1st Battalion of the 173d Rifle Regiment of the 90th Rifle Division, Capt Koshel, during the fighting of 22 June skillfully organized the machine gun fire plan. Calmly letting the enemy draw close, he had the enemy in machine gun crossfire. The advancing enemy suffered heavy losses and two enemy companies were destroyed.

The party-political apparatus of the units using the examples of courage and valor is conducting political work in the fighting. The personal example of valor, intrepidity of the communists and Komsomol members and the popularizing of the outstanding personnel as well as their combat experience—these are the main forms of party-political work now being conducted in the units....

The Air Forces units of the front over a period of 2 days have been fighting the enemy aviation and have posed the offensive of the enemy's motor-mechanized units.

The Air Forces personnel is devoting all its energies to carrying out the combat assignments. Regardless of the frequent enemy air bombings of our airfields and the great losses from the bombings, the flight-technical personnel has not ceased working on preparing the equipment and the personnel of the air bases to rebuild the airfields. There have been instances when the technical personnel under aerial bombing saved aircraft in removing them from under the attack.

Our pilots are intrepidly engaging the enemy.

The pilot from the 61st Air Regiment, Andreychenko, and the Commander of the 31st Air Regiment Putivko each individually engaged six-seven enemy aircraft.

At the same time, it must be pointed out that among the flight technical personnel there still are numerous discussions that the enemy aircraft are superior in speed to our SB I-16 and I-153 aircraft. There are few new design aircraft. Moreover, they still have not been sufficiently mastered by the flight personnel. The pilots flying the new types of fighters before the war had mastered only piloting techniques and had not made flights for firing.

Naturally, in the first air battles on these aircraft they could not fully utilize their advantages.

The retraining of flight personnel for the new aircraft is impossible under front conditions. It is advisable that the further retraining of the front's flight personnel be organized at airfields a long distance away from the front.

As combat sorties have shown, the MiG-3 fighter has the following shortcomings: its motor after 3 hours of flight requires a sparkplug change and in operation on dusty airfields the radiator honeycomb becomes clogged and the engine overheats.

Our airfields are little covered with antiaircraft defensive weapons and the presence of antiaircraft machine guns does not provide reliable protection. The existing anti-aircraft batteries fire poorly.

The absence of field shops prevents the rapid repair of even lightly damaged aircraft. For this reason in redeployment many of the aircraft were simply left at the airfields or destroyed by the technical flight personnel.

There is a growing need for establishing for the period of the war in the Air Forces of the front detachments to evacuate aircraft which after repair can be returned to service.

There is an acute shortage of oxygen for high-altitude flights. A supply of oxygen for the war cannot be created due to the shortage of tanks and the presence of just three charging plants for 24 air regiments. Also in short supply are spark plugs for the MiG-3 engines. Prior to the start of military operations we had only 700 pieces and this is clearly insufficient for the continuous operation of the given aircraft.

Due to the high losses of equipment and the reduction in aircraft engine life it is essential to replenish the aircraft fleet.

The front's political propaganda directorate during the day carried out the following measures:

1. Together with the front's medical department sent to the 8th Army a group of workers with the task of aiding the medical facilities in organizing the evacuation of wounded.
2. For providing aid to the civilian organizations in eliminating banded groups in the city of Vilno, an inspector from the front's political propaganda directorate was sent there. A senior instructor from the front's political propaganda directorate was sent to Kupishkis with a similar task.
3. Some 25 political workers have been made available to the chiefs of the political propaganda departments of the 8th and 11th Armies for creating reserve groups.
4. Our aviation dropped 32,000 leaflets in German appealing to the German soldiers in the enemy positions.

Also worked out were appeal leaflets directed to the enemy reserves and written in German, a leaflet on the heroism and courage of fighters from our units and a memorandum for the Red Armyman "On Maintaining Military Secrecy."

Chief of the Political Propaganda Directorate of the Northwestern Front, Brig Commissar Ryabchiy

TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 221, inv. 1362, file 18, sheets 3-7. Original.

ORDER OF THE STAFF OF THE 27TH ARMY OF THE NORTHWESTERN FRONT

24 June 1941, 0750 hours

Notify all units that the enemy is dropping paratroopers in the uniform of the Red Armymen and the NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] Troops.

Chief of Staff of 27th Army, Col Boloznev

TsAMO, folio 325, inv. 4579, file 1, sheet 88. Original.

OPERATIONS SUMMARY OF STAFF OF 27TH ARMY OF NORTHWESTERN FRONT

24 June 1941, 0800 hours

1. The enemy is continuing the pressure against Libau, in spreading in small groups to the north, northeast. The situation of Libau has not been precisely established but there are unverified data that the Libau garrison is holding out.

2. The 16th Rifle Division continues to defend the coast of Tallinn, Khasalu.

3. The 3d Separate Rifle Brigade has prepared to defend Ezel and Dago Islands.

4. The 67th Rifle Division with two battalions of the 56th Rifle Regiment and the 281st Rifle Regiment are fighting holding Libau, the area of Karya Osta (the data require verification and measures have been taken for clarification). The 114th Rifle Regiment and one battalion of the 56th Rifle Regiment are defending the coast on the section Kolgasrargo, Pavilosta. Losses have not been established.

5. A motorized regiment at 1230 hours came under an air raid by nine bombers in the area of Ayzpute.

Losses: 5 vehicles, 30 men wounded, 10 killed.

At 1430 hours on 24 June, the motorized regiment deployed 1.5 of a battalion ahead of Grobinya (at Libau) and engaged in battle small enemy units which did not put up any particular resistance. The commander of the motorized regiment was ordered to destroy the enemy more actively.

The division included up to 600 men from different units and the division is capable of arming them, having 800 rifles.

6. The LXV Rifle Corps from 1630 hours on 23 June began loading into trains.

The 123d Separate Signals Battalion was dispatched at 1530 hours.

7. The XXIV Rifle Corps with the corps units and the 181st Rifle Division are in the former areas. The 183d Rifle Division is at a day's halt in the area of Inchukalns (35 km to the northeast of Riga).

8. The combat engineer battalion of the 67th Rifle Division was working in the area of Kretinga where it is now and this is being ascertained.

The combat engineer battalions from the LXV Rifle Corps were working in the sector of the 11th Army.

Individual combat engineer battalions are under their formations.

Chief of Staff, Col Boloznev

Deputy Chief of Operations Section, Maj Stepanov

TsAMO, folio 325, inv. 4579, file 1, sheet 103. Original.

OPERATIONS SUMMARY OF STAFF OF 27TH ARMY OF NORTHWESTERN FRONT

24 June 1941, 1520 hours

The enemy is showing particular activity in Libau. At 0200 hours on 24 June 1941, it conducted a bombing and the objectives of the raids were the port, airfield, railroad station and the consequences of the bombing are being ascertained. The 67th Rifle Division during 23 June 1941 has been heavily engaged in an encirclement, suffering heavy losses.

At 2400 hours, communication with Libau was broken and could not be reestablished. At 0400 hours, from Ayzpute it was stated that Libau was burning. The 114th Rifle Regiment continues to defend the forward sector, having subordinated to itself the 2d Battalion of the 56th Rifle Regiment in the Pavilosta area, while the enemy continues to spread toward Zavilos.

The 16th Rifle Division is defending Ezel Island and is continuing defensive work. The XXVI Rifle Corps and the corps units are in the former area ready to load into trains.

The 181st Rifle Division is in camps at Gulbene, the 183d Rifle Division from 2200 hours on 23 June has been on a march in the area to the north of Riga while the 11th Rifle Division by 0100 hours on 23 June left for the new concentration area.

Chief of Staff of 27th Army Boloznev

TsAMO, folio 344, inv. 5564, file 1, sheets 74-75. Original

ORDER OF COMMANDER OF 27TH ARMY OF NORTHWESTERN FRONT TO COMMANDER OF 67TH RIFLE DIVISION

26 June 1941, 1545 hours

Without waiting to link up with support, by an immediate breakthrough leave Libau, putting under yourself the motorized rifle and battalions of the Riga School and the 114th Rifle Regiment, retreating to the line of the Liyeupe River by the axis Kuldiga—Tunumsk, having organized a strong defense in the area of Riga—Yurmala—Puchas. To your left are units of the 8th Army.

Commander of 27th Army, Maj Gen Berzarin

Military Council Member, Div Commissar Batrakov

TsAMO, folio 325, inv. 4579, file 1, sheet 115. Original.

REPORT OF COMMANDER OF III MECHANIZED CORPS TO COMMANDER OF NORTHWESTERN FRONT AND 8TH ARMY

24 June 1941, 1945 hours

During all our fighting there has been not a sign of our aviation. The enemy is constantly bombing. Request cover for actions of Skauldvile.

Commander of XIII Mechanized Corps, Maj Gen Tank Trps Kurkin

TsAMO, folio 344, inv. 5564, file 1, sheet 77. Original.

TELEGRAM FROM COMMANDER OF 8TH ARMY OF NORTHWESTERN FRONT TO CHIEF OF RED ARMY GENERAL STAFF

27 June 1941

I request a fighter cover. German aviation has become impudent.

Commander of 8th Army, Maj Gen Sobennikov

TsAMO, folio 221, inv. 1394, file 2, sheet 525. Original.

OPERATION SUMMARY OF STAFF OF NORTHWESTERN FRONT TO DEPUTY CHIEF OF RED ARMY GENERAL STAFF

30 June 1941, 0930 hours

1. On the Riga axis, units of the 8th Army in the evening of 28 June 1941 and during the night of 29 June 1941 crossed over Lake Tsesarka.... By the morning of 29 June 1941, basic forces of 8th Army had crossed.

It has not been possible to obtain the precise positions of each army formation as communications has large interruptions.

Units of the 67th Rifle Division, a motorized regiment of the 28th Tank Division and the Riga Infantry School are retreating from the Libau area.

No information about them. Killed in the fighting with his operations group was the commander of the XII Mechanized Corps, Shestopalov....

By a decision of the front's commander, the corps units are to be moved to the Madona area.

Chief of Staff of the Northwestern Front, Lt Gen Klenov

TsAMO, folio 344, inv. 5564, file 1, sheets 95-95 verso. Original.

OPERATION REPORT FROM STAFF OF 4TH ARMY OF WESTERN FRONT NO. 06

23 June 1941, 0900 hours

1. From 0600 hours on 23 June, army units went over to a counterattack: XIV Mechanized Corps on the Vidomlya axis and the XXVIII Rifle Corps to Brest.

As a result of the meeting engagement undertaken by the enemy with the forces of at least two panzer divisions on the Pruzhany axis and with forces of up to three infantry divisions with tanks on Kobrin, army counteroffensive was unsuccessful and the units by 0830 hours on 23 June had retreated to the line of Kuklin, Slobodka, Chakhets, Kobrin.

Enemy success was particularly aided by continuous air support with complete absence of air operations on our side.

2. XIV Mechanized Corps by 0830 hours on 23 June occupied the position:

a) The 30th Tank Division with a motorized regiment from the 205th Mechanized Division after fighting the enemy panzer divisions (tanks with 75-mm cannons) and an airborne assault force in the Puzhany area, retreated to the line of Kuklin, Minevo. Our tank guns, according to a statement from the commanders of the tank units, do not pierce the armor of the enemy tanks.

Division headquarters in Zebelin. Division lost 60 tanks.

b) The 22d Tank Division by this time after fighting the enemy infantry and tanks was concentrated in the area of Kutski, Ponyatichi, Andronovo. Division suffered heavy losses in fighting and transport vehicles at moment of pulling out of position as well as by enemy air force bombing.

3. The XXVIII Rifle Corps (42d and 6th Rifle Division) with a tank regiment and a motorized regiment from the 205th Motorized Rifle Division were met by the enemy with a force of up to three infantry divisions with tanks and strong aviation and retreated toward Kubrin on the line of Shitovich, Mazichi, Kobrin, with units of the 42d and 6th Rifle Division becoming mixed up and command of both corps and division very weak.

Units of the 42d and 6th Rifle Divisions in retreating from Brest lost a large amount of personnel and equipment (almost completely in the 31st Artillery Regiment, a significant amount of guns in the 204th and 17th Howitzer Artillery Regiment and the 447th Corps Artillery Regiment).

The 75th Rifle Division is retreating covering the Pinsk sector. No data on the 49th Rifle Division.

Communication by liaison officer in tank.

4. Poorly commanded units frightened by continuous attacks from low and rooftop altitudes by enemy air force retreating without slightest cause.

During the night in various places to the east and west of Kartuz-Bereza, points were established for apprehending retreating personnel, combat vehicles, artillery and transport. Here detachments are organized from them and they are sent to occupy sectors.

5. 10th Composite Air Division completely unable to fight because of losses.

6. I have decided to go over to the defensive on the line of the Yaselda River, Drogichin, where units will be put in order.

7. I request! I urgently request:

a) Activate our aviation to combat enemy aviation and with aviation check the advance of tanks on the Pruzhany and Kartuz-Bereza axes.

b) Artillery dump in Bonna Gura blown up by enemy, little ammunition remaining in units, not enough transport for delivery from Pinsk.

Commander of 4th Army, Maj Military Council Member, Div
Gen Korobkov Commissar Shlykov
Chief of Staff, Col Sandalov

TsAMO, folio 318, inv. 4631, file 6, sheets 31-33 (verso). Original.

POLITICAL REPORT FROM POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF XLVII RIFLE CORPS TO CHIEF OF POLITICAL PROPAGANDA DIRECTORATE OF WESTERN SPECIAL MILITARY DISTRICT

23 June 1941

The corps units of the XLVII Rifle Corps are basically completely battleworthy and are ready to carry out any task set by the party and government:

1. The combat readiness of the units and their supply level on 23 June 1941 is as follows:

The 462d Corps Artillery Regiment is undersupplied with the following materiel:

—1.5-ton trucks	Should be 101,	there are 49
—2.5-ton trucks	Should be 72,	there is 1
—caterpillar tractors	Should be 84,	there are 35
—tractor trailers	Should be 72,	there are 39
—motorcycles	Should be 14	there are 9

The regiment is 100-percent supplied with guns and ammunition.

The 273d Separate Signals Battalion is 95 percent of strength for personnel in accord with the mobilization plan for rank-and-file and leadership.

Lacking political personnel: two deputy company commanders for political affairs and a deputy combat engineer battalion commander for political affairs.

Equipment supply:

a) Signals property to 55 percent, Morse equipment 50 percent.

Situation poor with motor transport as battalion is only at 40 percent of strength, 60 percent not even requested by oblast military commissariat. Existing motor transport does not provide normal operation of battalion.

47th Corps Air Squadron: there is no deputy squadron commander for political affairs. Unit ready to fight with that amount of materiel which is on hand, that is, 47 percent. There is an order to obtain the lacking part of materiel in the city of Vitebsk, and a representative has left for there for receiving it.

Party and Komsomol buros in corps units are at full strength.

Party-political workers correspond to their purpose and are meeting the assigned tasks.

The corps units are 80 percent supplied with the equipment for party-political propaganda under wartime conditions.

With the receiving of the radio message of the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissar, Comrade V.M. Molotov, that the German air forces had violated our frontiers, meetings were immediately held in all the units. From the information of the political personnel in the corps units, one can see that the mood of the soldiers and commanders is completely healthy and all are full of fighting spirit and a feeling of class hate for Nazism.

An officer candidate from the regimental school of the 462d Corps Artillery Regiment, Comrade Maslov, in a conversation with comrades said: "I will beat the Nazis, and as long as I am alive, I will seek vengeance for the home Ukraine and for beloved Kiev."

The Red Armyman Grigoryan said: "I want to go into battle a communist, and I request I be admitted to the party."

The Red Armyman Ivanenko: "Together with all the Red Army, I will expel the Nazi rabble from the entire world and I request that as of today's date I be considered a communist."

In the 462d Corps Artillery Regiment over a period of several hours, some 67 requests to join the party were received and 42 requests for the Komsomol.

The regular personnel has still not arrived in the corps units and we are expecting them on 23-24 June 1941.

Acting Chief of Political Propaganda Department of XLVII Rifle Corps, Btln Commissar Krupskiy

TsAMO, folio 208, inv. 2526, file 27, sheets 8-9. Original.

OPERATIONS SUMMARY OF STAFF OF 4TH ARMY OF WESTERN FRONT NO. 01

24 June 1941

1. Units of the 4th Army, after a bandit enemy raid, retreated putting up resistance to the defensive lines at Kartuz-Bereza and by 1800 hours on 24 June had retreated with the remnants of its corps to the line of the Shchara River, where they dug in for putting up further resistance.

2. The remnants of units from the XXVIII Rifle Corps, the 6th and 42d Rifle Divisions after a series of defensive battles by 1800 hours had retreated to the area: Rusinovichi, Talmanovichi, where they are being put in order; these remnants are not battleworthy.

3. The 75th Rifle Division—no information. It should be covering (on the right flank) the Pinsk sector on a line 6-7 km to the east of Kobrin.

4. The 55th Rifle Division after dismounting from motor transport went over to the defensive along the line of Stelovo, Kulaki. At 1400 hours it was unable to withstand the offensive of the motor mechanized enemy units with strong air softening up, and began retreat and by 1800 hours had retreated to the line of Votki, Mazurki.

5. The XIV Mechanized Corps, in defending actively and going over repeatedly to counterattacks, suffered heavy losses in materiel and personnel and by 25 June did not represent a battleworthy formation.

The 120th Howitzer Artillery Regiment was not employed due to the rapidity of the fighting.

The 10th Composite Air Division on 26 June suffered enormous losses (both the fighter and ground attack air regiments were virtually completely destroyed). In the first half of the day of 26 June, they did not participate in the fighting. Located in Pinsk.

6. From the XLIX Rifle Division there has been no contact since the moment of setting off upon the alert.

Conclusion:

a) All units with the exception of the 55th and 25th Rifle Divisions are unable to fight and need emergency building up with personnel and materiel and putting in order;

b) Basic losses in materiel are from air and artillery attacks and the surprise attack of the first day (almost completely out of the fight are the 447th and 455th Corps Artillery Regiments and a significant portion of

the 31st Artillery Regiment, the 402d and 17th Howitzer Artillery Regiments and over 75 percent of the materiel of the XIV Mechanized Corps).

The subunits and sometimes units retreating in disorder must be stopped and returned to the front to the commanders of all the formations, beginning with the army commander, although these measures, regardless even of the use of weapons, have not produced the proper effect.

The staff is in a grove 2 km to the south of Sinyavka. Communication only by liaison officers.

Chief of Staff of 4th Army, Col Sandalov

TsAMO, folio 318, inv. 4631, file 6, sheets 18-19. Original

OPERATION REPORT FROM COMMANDER OF 4TH ARMY OF WESTERN FRONT NO. 010

26 June 1941, 1600 hours

With difficulty restored order and on two sectors from Voloshevo and from Urechye I personally led the units back almost to Slutsk.

I committed virtually the entire strength of the army to the forward front for restoring the situation. The enemy has burned Slutsk and from 1530 hours has organized an offensive.

Fresh units needed immediately.

Commander of 4th Army, Maj Gen Korobkov

TsAMO, folio 318, inv. 4631, file 6, sheet 42. Original.

OPERATION ORDER OF AIR FORCE STAFF OF SOUTHWESTERN FRONT NO. OP/1

23 June 1941, 0100 hours

1. The enemy, in committing mechanized formations on the axis of Ustilug, Vladimir-Volynskiy and Kristynopol-Radzikhov on the front of the 5th Army, has created a threat of breaking our defending units.

On the front of the 6th, 26th and 12th Armies, the enemy attacks have been driven off and the troops are holding the line of the state frontier.

The enemy Air Force on 22 June bombed our airfields, operating in small groups and from low altitudes.

2. On 22 June, the mobile units from the front of the 5th and 6th Armies launched a concentric strike with the task of destroying the enemy grouping in the area of Sokal, Grubeshuv.

3. The front's Air Forces on 23 June, in supporting the offensive of the front, operated against the motor mechanized enemy units in the area of Sokal, Grubeshuv.

4. The Air Forces of the 15th Army, the 14th and 62d Air Divisions and the 18th Air Division, in cooperating with the XXII Mechanized Corps (the XXII Mechanized

Corps by 1100 hours on 23 June was concentrated in the area of Voynitsa Station and Turiysk), are destroying the motor mechanized enemy units in the area of Ustilug, Grabeshuv [sic.].

a) The 18th Air Division at dawn of 23 June by successive wave attacks destroyed the accumulation of enemy tanks in the area of Ustilug, Grabeshuv [sic.], Korytnitsa.

Intensity: one division sortie.

Upon carrying out designated task, to be in alert No. 2 for carrying out the subsequent task.

From the morning of 23 June, the 90th Long-Range Bomber Regiment from the airfield of Bronniki is to redeploy to airfields according to the operations plan.

b) The 62d Air Division (the 52d and 94th High-Speed Bomber Regiments with just the SB aircraft), in cooperating with the XXII Mechanized Corps, from 1100 hours on 23 June, by successive raids echeloned in altitude and time destroyed the motor mechanized enemy units in the area of Ustilug, Grubeshuv, Korytnitsa, preventing them from reaching the area of Vladimir-Volynskiy.

Intensity: one division sortie.

Upon carrying out set mission, to be in alert No. 2 for operations against enemy panzer grouping on the same axis.

c) The 14th Air Division is to cover the XXII Mechanized Corps in its concentration area (the area of Turiysk and Voynitsa Station) and by patrolling in the same area to support the combat of the 18th and 62d Air Divisions.

5. The Air Forces of the 6th Army (15th and 16th Air Divisions) and the 33d High-Speed Bomber Regiment of the 19th Air Division are destroying the enemy grouping in the area of Sokal, Kristynopol, Parkhach.

a) The 33d High-Speed Bomber Regiment at dawn of 23 June by successive wave operations in time and altitude destroyed the enemy grouping in the area of Sokal, Kristynopol, Parkhach.

In returning to the base airfield, landing at the Romanovka Airfield (Berdichev) for the chance of fueling up with a subsequent flight to their own airfield (Gorodishche).

Intensity: one regiment sortie (just Ar-2 and SB).

Upon carrying out the task, to be in alert No. 2 for subsequent actions in the same area.

b) The 16th Air Division, in cooperating with the IV Mechanized Corps, by successive echeloned operations is to destroy the enemy ground troops in the area of Kristynopol, Sokal.

Actions of the 86th High-Speed Bomber Regiment are to be covered by fighters from the 92d Fighter Air Regiment.

Bomber intensity: two regiment sorties.

c) The 15th Air Division is to cover the region of Lvov and the concentration area of the IV Mechanized Corps and the 3d Cavalry Division.

6. The 17th Air Division (20th and 91st Fighter Air Regiments) is to cover the rail junctions of Proskurov, Shepetovka, Novograd-Volynsk, preventing the penetration of the enemy Air Force into this region.

The 48th High-Speed Bomber Regiment (Pe-2 aircraft) is to be spread out at the operational airfields as the airfields move behind the frontier and carefully camouflage.

7. The 64th Air Division (the 12th, 149th and 166th Fighter Air Regiments) are to provide a cover against the air enemy for the concentrating of the 12th Army in the area of Stanislavuv, Chernovitsy, destroying the enemy Air Force.

8. The 44th Air Division is to redeploy the 88th Fighter Air Regiment to the airfields of Kochubeyev, Pudlovtsy and transfer the regiment to the commander of the 64th Air Division.

9. The 138th and 136th Bomber Regiments are in my reserve at alert status No. 2 for carrying out tasks to operate against the enemy ground troops.

10. I am at the command post in Tarnopol.

Commander of Front Air Forces, Lt Gen Ptukhin Acting Chief of Staff of Front Air Forces, Col Taygrebert

TsAMO, folio 229, inv. 161, file 5, sheets 3-5. Original.

**POLITICAL REPORT FROM POLITICAL
PROPAGANDA DIRECTORATE OF KIEV
SPECIAL MILITARY DISTRICT TO CHIEF OF
MAIN POLITICAL PROPAGANDA
DIRECTORATE OF RED ARMY**

23 June 1941

During the night of 22-23 June 1941, the enemy showed activeness on the flanks of the 6th Army and dropped airborne assault forces in a number of points in the rear of the front's armies.

Intense fighting is underway on the front of the 5th Army. An offensive of four infantry divisions and one panzer division was noted. During the night several enemy assault forces were dropped in the army rear.

In the forest to the north of Oleshitse an accumulation of tanks has been noted. Large enemy forces are conducting an offensive in the region of Peremyshl—Krakovets—Rava-Russka. Lvov has been repeatedly bombed by small groups of enemy aircraft.

The 12th Army, having repulsed all enemy attacks, on the left flank along the entire front is holding the state frontier in strict accord with the cover plan. On the Chernovtsy sector, the enemy has been thrown back behind the Prut River.

The 26th Army is successfully repulsing unabating enemy assaults in the region of Peremyshl and is holding the San River.

During the night and morning, the enemy landed assault forces in Khodorov, Drogobych, Borislav (the last two were destroyed) and Koskov (20 km to the south of Shepetovka). The last detachment is moving up to Staro-Konstantinov. The 17th Air Division has come under fighter action.

The 5th, 6th, 12th and 26th Armies with the cover units are conducting stubborn fighting and are continuing to concentrate the troops toward the front.

Stubborn fighting has been carried out by the 99th Rifle Division in the area of Peremyshl. The enemy has endeavored to outflank the city from the north and south and has begun to erect bridges across the San River.

The 60th Rifle Division, having repulsed the enemy assaults in the Khertsia area, captured six machine guns, one gun and one mortar. Some seven German soldiers were taken prisoner.

In an air fight the 15th Air Division (6th Army) downed 9 enemy aircraft and lost 5 aircraft. During 22 June, the division conducted 11 air battles.

The air units of the 12th Army downed 19 enemy aircraft. Two aircraft were downed by antiaircraft artillery (the crews of Jr Commanders Kovalev and Malokhov in the area of Stanislavuv) and 4 German pilots were taken prisoner by the soldiers of these crews. As a total for the 12th Army, 12 German pilots have been captured.

The political morale of the units is strong. The speech of Comrade Molotov and the order of the people's commissar are being broadly explained to the personnel of the front's units. Where the situation has permitted, meetings have been held. The mood of the personnel is militant. The speech of Comrade Molotov and the order of the people's commissar of defense evoked the greatest combat zeal among the personnel. The men and commanders have obliged themselves to honorably carry out the demands of the government and the order of the people's commissar to destroy the Nazi pirates.

The personnel of the units fighting the enemy has shown exceptional heroism and valor.

One platoon of border troops drove off an attack of 2,000 Germans with heavy losses for them (12th Army).

A commander of a machine gun company from the 140th Separate Machine Gun Battalion, being encircled for more than 8 hours, constantly fought the enemy, driving off the encircling groups. Several times contact was restored with the permanent emplacements. Its deputy, the Jr Political Instructor Kolesnikov under the same conditions successfully repulsed the encircling groups.

The junior lieutenant from the first company of the 35th Separate Machine Gun Battalion, Dziruk, with 20 soldiers and 40 workers from the UNS [supply chief directorate] No. 81 over a period of several hours on 22 June 1941 held Khertsu until the arrival of reinforcements and fought intensely.

During marches the units have shown exceptional endurance and organization. Thus, a number of regiments from the 58th Rifle Division over the period of a day walked 120-130 km to the concentration area. The march was made without laggards. During the period of the march the political apparatus, the party and Komsomol organizations thoroughly explained to the personnel the order of the people's commissar of defense and the speech of Comrade Molotov.

During the period of military operations, discipline in the district units has risen sharply. The command personnel has begun to place higher demands on their subordinates.

There have been instances where the peasants have provided significant aid to the Red Army units in capturing enemy paratroopers and saboteurs. Thus, in the area of Khertsu three pilots bailed out of a stricken German aircraft and they were caught by the peasants and delivered to the troop unit....

Today the army and divisional newspapers have come out and they treat the courage and heroism shown by the units in fighting against German Nazism.

The political bodies continue work over the speech of Comrade Molotov and the order of the people's commissar and are mobilizing all the forces to carry out the set tasks.

Upon the proposal of the military council and the political propaganda directorate, the Tarnopol party obkom adopted a series of measures to increase vigilance, the mobilizational readiness of the local population, to clear out hostile elements and maintain order in the city and rayons.

Security has been strengthened for the staffs of the units and formations, the airfields and parking areas, facilities and enterprises.

In the rayons the local party organizations are conducting extensive political work among the public.

Chief of the Political Propaganda Directorate of the Kiev Special Military District, Brig Commissar
Mikhaylov

TsAMO, folio 229, inv. 213, file 12, sheets 12-16.
Original.

OPERATIONS SUMMARY OF STAFF OF 12TH ARMY OF SOUTHWESTERN FRONT

23 June 1941, 0700 hours

1. The 12th Army during the day of 22 June 1941, having repulsed enemy assaults on individual sectors, has firmly held the line along the state frontier.

2. The enemy has shown greatest activeness on the axis of Khertsu, Novoselitsa, Lipkany.

3. The XIII Rifle Corps by 0500 hours reached the state frontier in its own defensive areas. The precise position of the units has not been established.

Staff of the XIII Corps in Sinovudzhko Vyzhne.

4. The XLVIII Mountain Rifle Division has reached its defensive areas. The enemy has not shown activity.

The 170th Mountain Rifle Regiment has occupied the sector, Vorevka, Syvulya, Rafailova, Semena. The region of Polyanitsa with one company.

5. The 335th Mountain Rifle Regiment occupies elev. 12560, Tataruv, Vorokhta.

The 279th Mountain Rifle Regiment elev. 1240, Kreva. One company occupies elev. 1152, Dzembronya.

The 368th Mountain Rifle Regiment in the second echelon in the area of Delyatyn. Division staff in Delyatyn.

6. The XVII Rifle Corps during the entire day of 22 June has been fighting stubbornly on the line of Fontina-Alba, Khertsu and by 0500 hours occupied:

The 96th Mountain Rifle Division—Ur. Medvedi, Seletin, Fontina-Alba exclusively. The second echelon of the 155th Mountain Rifle Regiment was concentrated in the area of Vergomet, the 651st Mountain Rifle Regiment in the area of Storozhinets, elev. 500, Panka. Staff of 96th Division on edge of forest 8 km to the southwest of Voloka.

60th Mountain Rifle Regiment—Fontina-Alba, Dzherbouts, Proboteschiy, Khertsu. Having repulsed repeated enemy assaults on the Khertsu axis, it is firmly holding the front: the second echelon of the 350th Mountain Rifle Regiment is concentrated in the area of elev. 338, elev. 309, Kotul Bainskiy. Division staff in Voloka.

The 164th Rifle Division, having repulsed enemy assaults and attempts at crossings in the area of Tarasauts, Vanchikaunts, Lipkany, is firmly holding the front of Tarasauts, Lipkany, Tetskan. The second echelon of the 620th Rifle Regiment is concentrated in the area of Staucheni. The staff of the 164th Rifle Division is in Khotin. Staff of the XVII Corps in Chernovitsy.

7. The XVI Mechanized Corps from 0500 hours: the 15th Tank Division is completing concentration in the area of Kouman, Sadagura, Yukovtse. Division staff in Kuchurmik.

The 39th Tank Division is concentrated in the area of Teresheny, Lukavitsa, the eastern edge of Chakhor.

The 240th Motorized Rifle Division (minus the 836th Motorized Rifle Regiment) is on the march and the head of the columns has reached the line of Grembochek, Novosyulka. Staff of XVI Corps in Kotsman.

8. There is wire communication with the 58th Mountain Rifle Division, by radio with the XVI Mechanized Corps with the XIII and XVII Rifle Corps, communication with the 26th Army to the right is with ST-35 equipment. No contact with unit to the left.

9. Weather is variable cloudiness.

10. Enemy aviation at 0600 hours bombed Stanislav, Zablotuv. Losses and captured equipment are being clarified.

During 22 June, the aviation of the 12th Army lost:

The 12th Fighter Air Regiment lost 36 aircraft on the ground, 4 of these can be repaired, and 3 aircraft lost in battle. Of the enemy aviation, 11 aircraft were downed.

The 149th Fighter Air Regiment lost 15 aircraft on the ground and 2 in the air. Eight enemy aircraft were downed.

The 247th Fighter Air Regiment is out of action and 42 aircraft were destroyed.

The 166th Fighter Air Regiment had 4 aircraft destroyed on the ground and 10 aircraft damaged.

Losses in the rifle units are being established.

Chief of Staff of the 12th Army Arushanyan

Chief of Operations Department Levin

TsAMO, folio 359, inv. 6435, file 1, sheet 2. Original.

WEHRMACHT DOCUMENTS

Department of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence

23 June 1941

1) Assessment of enemy forces in Belostok area:

On the basis of the last map issued by OKH, Department for the Study of Foreign Armies East, before the start of the operation in the area of Brest—Pruzhan—Volkovysk—Grodno—Lomzha assumed the following enemy forces.

15 rifle divisions, 1 motorized division, 1 tank division, 4 tank brigades, 8 cavalry divisions.

Of these formations, prisoner evidence has for now confirmed:

8 rifle divisions, 1 motorized division, 1 (?) tank brigade, 1 tank division.

Regardless of intensified intelligence, in the Belostok area as yet large forces of cavalry and tanks have not yet been discovered. Only on the grounds that the morning air reconnaissance on 23 June detected heavy traffic

from west to east in the general of Baranovichi and Lida can one assume that there still are large enemy forces in the Belostok area.

2) According to a report from Department Iz from the staff of the 4th Army, in comparison with the day -B, the enemy has not altered the method of fighting. With weak artillery actions, the enemy is fighting in places stubbornly and desperately. For now there have been no reports on deserters or Russian soldiers who have surrendered. The number of prisoners as before is small.

TsAMO, inv. 12462, file 547, sheets 35-36. Translated from the German.

ORDER NO. 3 FOR 3D PANZER GROUP FOR 26 JUNE 1941

Operations Department of 3d
Panzer Group

Command Post, 23 June 1941

1. The enemy continues to retreat ahead of the 3d Panzer Group to the east and in the direction of Vilnya and in individual places has put up weak resistance. Further to the south larger enemy forces are involved in the fighting. Details are given in the appended information bulletin about the enemy.

2. The 9th Army on 23 June with the forces of the VIII Army Corps took Grodno and on 24 June with the forces of the XX Army Corps began an offensive on the Lunna axis while the forces of the VIII Army Corps are moving in the Lida direction, with the aim of blocking the road to the east for the enemy divisions discovered in the Belostok area.

The Command of the 2d Panzer Group intends by the evening of 23 June to reach the sector Shara—Byten—Slonim.

The 16th Army during the second half of the day reached a general line 25 km to the west of Kovno in the area of Volki (30 km to the northwest of Kovno). A bridgehead was created.

The 4th Panzer Group is advancing to the east with the right corps to the east of Dubissa between Seredzius—Arigala and with the left corps across the line Rosini—Vidukle—Lioliay.

3. The 3d Panzer Group, from 2400 hours on 23 June 1941, in being directly subordinate to Army Group B has continued the breakthrough, having turned to the south-east in a direction to the north of Minsk, and for now occupies the isthmus between Volozhin and Molo-dechno in order, in cooperation with the 2d Panzer Group, to prevent the retreat of the enemy located in the Belostok region via Minsk.

Here:

The LVII Army Corps via Olshany should occupy the elevations in the area of Volozhin; the XXXIX Army

Corps via Smorgon should occupy the bridgehead in the area and to the south of Molodechno.

Ground reconnaissance should be conducted along the line Rakov—Radoshkovichi.

4. The V and VI Army Corps from 2400 hours on 23 June are to be directly subordinate to the 9th Army.

5. The demarcation line between the LVII and XXXIX Army Corps is: Oshmiana (XXXIX Army Corps)—the Oshminana Road, Voynichi, Krevo (XXXIX Army Corps)—Losk (XXXIX Army Corps)—Kopatse (LVII Army Corps)—Grodek (LVII Army Corps), Kalashki (LVII Army Corps)—the Svisloch River (XXXIX Army Corps).

6. Cooperation of aviation:

a) The VIII Air Corps is to be redeployed to temporary airfields forward in the Varena area and is continuing to raid the enemy aviation units assumed further to the east.

Increased attention must be paid to direct support for the land battle.

b) Air reconnaissance: after the redeployment of the reconnaissance squadrons to airfields to the east of the Neman, Minsk—Borisov—Polazak—Kovno. It is essential to establish whether the enemy is moving up forces from the region of Minsk, from Polazak and Dvinsk and particularly whether it intends to go over to the defensive on the Viliya River and at the permanent emplacements near Minsk. Is rear traffic noted to the east and north-east.

It is essential to make an aerial survey of the crossings over the Viliya River in the area of Sovenka, Vileyka, Smorgon, Danisev, Zhodzishki, Nestanishki, Mikhalishki.

bb) Tactical reconnaissance for the LVII Army Corps should be conducted initially in the region of Zhablok—Lida—Bodganov—Oshmiana—Olkiniki.

Tactical reconnaissance for the XXXIX Army Corps should be carried out initially in the area of Olkiniki—Oshmiana—Mikhalishki—Nemenchin—Kovno (exclusively). It is essential to establish whether the enemy is moving up forces against the flanks of the panzer group, and whether traffic is noted retreating to the east. Particular attention must be paid to the tank concentrations.

cc) Battle reconnaissance:

Battle reconnaissance should be carried out ahead and along the sides of the zone of advance of the panzer divisions.

c) Employment of antiaircraft artillery

Light antiaircraft battalions are to defend the route of advance of their divisions.

1. An antiaircraft battalion from the 29th Artillery Regiment after relief in the Merkine area is to protect the road junctions of Eyshyshki and Verenov.

2. An antiaircraft battalion from the 36th Artillery Regiment prior to relief is to guard the crossing over the Neman River in the Olita area and after this assume the guarding of the defile in the area of Troki Nove.

7. Signals.

a) A signals company from the 3d Panzer Group is to lay a group communications line from Alove via Babriskis (switchboard), Varena (switchboard), Eyshyshki (switchboard), Verenov (switchboard) to Oshmiana and establish lateral communication with the XXXIX Army Corps from Verenov to Zolesniki (26 km to the north of Verenov).

The LVII Army Corps is to lay its own corps cable from the switchboard at Eyshyshki or Verenov.

The XXXIX Army Corps is to lay its own corps cable from the switchboard of Zolesniki into the offensive zone.

b) Organization:

The LVII Army Corps is to include the 2d Long-Distance Cable Company from the Signals Regiment of the 3d Panzer Group in Varena. Otherwise, the organization is to remain as before.

8. Command posts: for the 3d Panzer Group as of 1000 hours on 24 June, Alove (12 km to the southeast of Olita).

LVII Army Corps: the estate of Okla (2 km to the north of Eyshyshki).

V Army Corps: Zeyriyay.

XXXIX Army Corps: Vazgirdoniay (12 km to the north of Varena).

VI Army Corps: Vartay (11 km to the southeast of Priyenay).

(Signature illegible)

Information Bulletin No. 7 Concerning Enemy

Appendix to Order No. 3 for the 3d Panzer Group of 23 June 1941

On 23 June an enemy retreat was established via Vilnius to the southeast, east and northeast. Destruction of bridges by the enemy not noticed anywhere. Traffic on rail section of Lida, Vilnius often halted due to raids of our aviation and as a consequence of this entire transport trains have been unloaded in the area of Verenov and further north.

From statements of prisoners and local inhabitants, the XXIX Army Corps (corps units and the 184th Rifle Division) as of 22 June should have begun leaving from

the camp of Varena to the east. In the area of Volozhin—Oshmiana—Zolesniki—Ivye, troops not established. At 1800 hours, columns of trucks were noticed moving from Oshmiana to the east. New weak motorized forces are heading toward Minsk from the east. It is to be expected that the enemy, in holding the Vilnius road junction, will continue its retreat to the east and north-east.

For now we must not count on an offensive by enemy forces from Minsk to the northwest. Possibly these forces, by occupying the position for the retreating troops among the fortifications in the Minsk area should facilitate the retreat of the forces from the Belostok area, as a consequence of capturing Grodno the route of retreat via this road junction has been cut off for the enemy units.

The enemy divisions established on 22 June ahead of the 3d Panzer Group:

Units of the 23d, 8th or 188th, 128th and 33d Rifle Divisions and the 5th Tank Division. Assumptions that the rifle divisions had not yet been completely mobilized and a portion of their artillery without traction should still be in the arsenal still requires verification. The 5th Tank Division must be viewed as greatly exhausted.

TsAMO, inv. 12462, file 118, sheets 2-8. Translated from the German.

Evening Report From Department of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of Staff of 9th Army

Department of Intelligence and Counterintelligence

23 June 1941, 1740 hours

1) Enemy actions have assumed a more planned nature. On the Lomzha sector, retreat of the 8th, 2d and 27th Divisions to the position of Bobr. Prisoner information confirms that the enemy intends to hold this position. On the Grodno sector, an attempt by the 3d Army with the forces of the 56th and 85th Divisions to organize a defensive on the Neman to the north of Grodno along the line Dabrova—Novy Dvor—Grodno. Here strong tank groups have counterattacked (the 29th, 86th Motorized Infantry Divisions, 18th Tank Regiment and individual battalions). On a captured map to the south of Grodno beyond Lozozna there is shown the defense of the 2d, 6th and 10th Divisions. Possibly this is a training map.

In the area to the south of Grodno, the 1st and 2d Motor Mechanized Brigades have appeared. Attempts by the 5th Tank Division and, possibly, units of the XXIX Rifle Corps to halt the breakthrough of the panzer group were completely repulsed.

2) The following formations can be considered defeated or not representing any fighting force: 56th and 85th Rifle Divisions, 86th Motor Mechanized Brigade, 188th

Rifle Division, 23d and 128th Mechanized Divisions, 5th Tank Division and units of the XXIX Lithuanian Corps.

Of the 56th Rifle Division, only the 132d Rifle Regiment is holding out in the Sopotskin area.

3) The Russians fight to the last man, they prefer death to being taken prisoner (the order of the political commissars). Heavy losses in personnel, few prisoners. In Grodno captured large supplies of weapons, ammunition and food. On 22 June, 180 tanks hit. Of these just the 8th Infantry Division in the fighting for Grodno destroyed 80 tanks.

TsAMO, inv. 12462, file 547, sheets 33, 34. Translated from the German.

(To Be Continued)

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FIGHTING AFGHANISTAN

Principles of Afghan Military Doctrine at Present Stage

18011008D VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL
in Russian No 7, Jul 89 (signed to press 14 Jul 89
pp 35-40

[Article: "Principles of Afghan Military Doctrine at Present Stage (Theses of a Speech by the President of the Afghanistan Republic at a Meeting of the Leadership of the Armed Forces on 22 June 1989)"]

[Text] [Editorial Introduction] Najibullah is a prominent political and state leader in Afghanistan. He was born on 6 August 1947. He received his higher education at Kabul University which he completed in 1975.

From his youth, Najibullah took an active part in the revolutionary struggle. He has been a member of the PDPA [People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan] since 1965, that is, since its founding. Since 1977, he has been a member of the PDPA Central Committee.

After the victory of the April Revolution in Afghanistan, he worked as the secretary of the Kabul City PDPA Committee, and then was in diplomatic service being the Afghan Ambassador to Iran. Over a period of several years, he headed the state security bodies. He has the military rank of lieutenant general.

From 1981, he has been a member of the Politburo of the PDPA Central Committee, and since 1985, the secretary of the PDPA Central Committee.

In May 1986, at the 18th Plenum of the PDPA Central Committee, Najibullah was elected the General Secretary of the PDPA Central Committee. Since November 1987, he has been President of the Republic of Afghanistan. Najibullah has been decorated with a state award.

The Afghan leadership headed by Najibullah is carrying out a course of halting the bloodshed in the nation and establishing an inter-Afghan dialogue. [End of Editorial Introduction]

Our republic and its Armed Forces have entered a new crucial stage of their development and this will determine the fate of our motherland and our long-suffering people. A particularly great role during this historic period is to be played by the Afghan Armed Forces. As a whole, they are worthily carrying out their patriotic duty to the people. The defenders of Jelalabad and Khost by the heroic defense of these cities have covered themselves with undying glory and have again glorified the courageous Afghan people and their Armed Forces to the entire world.

But under conditions where our peace-loving proposals are not being accepted and aggression is being forced on us, we have no other alternative but to defend our motherland and continue the armed struggle, although we are well aware that the people and the personnel of the Armed Forces are tired of the 10-year war forced on us.

After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghan territory, virtually a new stage began in the life of our valorous Armed Forces when they were forced independently to oppose not only the armed detachment of the internal counterrevolution but also direct Pakistani aggression supported by the United States, Saudi Arabia and a number of other states.

In line with this, all the personnel of the Armed Forces, and primarily the leadership, should have a profound and clear understanding of the essence and nature of the defense tasks at the present stage and the methods of carrying them out. It is essential to completely overcome all the existing differences and achieve a unified understanding of the paths of military organizational development, the employment of the Armed Forces, their training and command of the troops. The unity of the people, the party and the Armed Forces provides our main force and guarantee for the successful carrying out of all the tasks confronting us. The enemy is wagering chiefly on our disunity and the fostering of differences. If we wish to survive and be victorious, we must not provide these opportunities for the enemy. For this reason, each real patriot and any right-thinking man should realize that separately we can only be beaten but together, in acting in solidarity and rejecting all personal ambitions, we can and should be victorious regardless of all the difficulties confronting us.

In the history of all states, one of the factors which unites the armed forces and gives them unity of thought, will and action has always been military doctrine. It is no accident that in the Soviet Union V.I. Lenin and M.V. Frunze began their activities by working out a unified military doctrine for the Soviet state. And in our times,

the leading states of the entire world are clarifying their military doctrines. The time has come for us to do this also.

You know that by military doctrine one usually has in mind a system of officially adopted views in the state concerning the nature of war, the methods of waging it, organizational development and training of the armed forces.

The distinction of military doctrine from military science and generally military theory is that military doctrine includes only the most important, fundamental guiding provisions which are obligatory for the military personnel. You can argue as much as you wish over theoretical questions but after the official views have been given and the theoretical provisions have assumed a doctrinal nature, they must be strictly carried out.

Under present-day conditions, in the defensive military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact states in the forefront is the task of preventing war and repelling aggression, if it is imposed on them.

We also in Afghanistan at present must give some thought to ending, escaping from the war imposed upon us, but, of course, under the proper conditions.

Proceeding from this, the essence of the military doctrine of Afghanistan at the present stage can be defined as a system of officially adopted views concerning the implementation of the policy of national reconciliation, the defense of the nation, the paths of military organizational development, the training of the armed forces and the methods of conducting armed combat for the sake of defending the motherland against counterrevolutionary forces and foreign aggression.

In military doctrine, a distinction is usually made between its political and military-technical aspects.

On the Political Aspect of Afghan Military Doctrine

The main provisions in the political aspect of our military doctrine were reviewed at the Loya Jirga [Grand National Assembly] held in May of this year.

At present, I would again like to sum up just its most important provisions.

First of all, Afghan military doctrine, as the doctrine of any peace-loving state, on the political level has a strictly defensive nature. This is expressed in the fact that our state in principle repudiates war as a means for resolving political, economic or ideological contradictions. The year's long experience of our nation has shown persuasively that none of these problems can be resolved by military means.

We are conducting a peace-loving policy, we are firmly and steadfastly in favor of a peaceful resolution of all disputes and differences. The republic does not have any aggressive, predatory plans against any other states. We are in favor of equal collaboration with all countries,

primarily neighboring ones, and for the strict observance of sovereignty and noninterference into the internal affairs of other countries.

Proceeding from these principles, at the Loya Jirga we reaffirmed our adherence for a policy of national reconciliation and established a number of specific measures to deepen and practically realize this policy which we will carry out consistently and constantly.

Thus, we are against the continuing war, and with all our force we are working to put an end to it as quickly as possible, and to establish peace and cooperation in the Afghan land for all strata of society and peoples for the sake of creating a peace-loving, flourishing Afghan state. This policy of ours is supported by a majority of the people and by a certain portion of the opposition forces. There is no doubt that this support will grow.

At the same time, we are aware that peace and national reconciliation depend not solely upon us. As long as the irreconcilable forces of opposition and their foreign instigators refuse to abandon their adventuristic plans of overthrowing the existing system, continuing military operations and threatening reprisal against all who support the Republic of Afghanistan, we have no other solution than to continue to defend our motherland, our cities and villages, our homes, our families, all honest Afghans who believe us and who continue to collaborate with us in carrying out the ideas of the April Revolution.

We have already said that on the path of our revolutionary transformations there have been numerous errors and negative phenomena. As historical experience shows, no people in the world, no revolution could fully avoid them. Our party has condemned and repudiated the committed errors and distortions. But we will continue to defend and protect the fundamental ideas of liberating the people and their development along the path of progressive changes, including by armed means. We are confident that truth is on our side and for this reason we will certainly be victorious.

The political aspect of military doctrine also provides that the defense of the fatherland is not only a task of the Armed Forces but also an undertaking of the entire party, all the people, all society. For this reason, considering the extraordinary situation in the nation, additional mobilization measures are required for resolving the defense tasks of the entire national economy and transport. We must make more rational and just use of the material aid which is being provided us by the USSR and at the same time more fully utilize the internal resources of our nation. The governors and the garrison chiefs should in every possible way assist in developing construction work, the rebuilding of mosques, schools and hospitals, expanding production and trade and so forth.

On the Military-Technical Aspect of Afghan Military Doctrine

The military-technical aspect of military doctrine usually provides answers to four questions.

The first question. Against what enemy must we be ready to fight, and what would be the nature of armed combat? In contrast to other nations, for this question we have not had long to guess. War has already been imposed on us and the enemies are known.

The second question. What armed forces are needed for such a war in terms of organization and establishment and technical equipping? The areas of military organizational development have already been established in our nation but these must continue to be improved.

The third question. What should be the methods of carrying out defense tasks, the methods of carrying out the tactical and operational-tactical actions of the armed forces in repelling aggression and armed actions by the opposition? In this regard, our Armed Forces have acquired great combat experience, but the effectiveness of the combat actions by our troops need to be particularly increased.

Here in our military doctrine concerning the methods of combat, it must be an issue not of the viewpoint of general principles and the requirements of military art but rather on a strictly practical level in terms of the specific situational conditions under which the Afghan Armed Forces must carry out the combat tasks.

And the fourth question of military doctrine: By what forms and methods are we to carry out the training, political and military education of the personnel of the Armed Forces so that they be up to the tasks confronting them.

Let me take up in greater detail certain of these questions, bearing in mind that we must achieve a unity of assessing the military-political situation and a unity of approach to resolving the military problems confronting us.

The overall situation. The military-political and strategic situation in the nation continues to be determined by two most important circumstances. On the one hand, this is the more decisive military-political and strategic goals of the counterrevolutionary forces related to the overthrow of the existing system and the seizure of power in Afghanistan and not only the guerrilla actions to destabilize the situation in the nation, as was the case before. In line with the broadening of the socioeconomic base of the opposition in the nation and the military might from the United States, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, the economic and military capabilities of the opposition are growing and this has led to increased scope of military operations.

On the other hand, after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghan territory, the Afghan Armed Forces have had independently to carry out more complicated

defense tasks than before with a substantial cutback in the military forces opposing the counterrevolution, particularly aviation. At the same time, the withdrawal of the Soviet troops and the overt intervention by Pakistan have weakened the political positions of the counterrevolution, for the ground has been cut away from under the ideology of a "jihad" (a holy war against infidels) and this simultaneously helps raise the authority of the Afghan government and consolidate the patriotic forces forced to fight not only against the internal opposition but also foreign aggression.

As a whole, over a period of almost 4 months of armed combat, the opposition has been unable to achieve its military-political goals and its hopes of the fall of the existing regime in Afghanistan have not been realized. The counterrevolutionary forces have been unable to take a single important point (Jelalabad, Khost, Qandahar and others) or a single new provincial center which they were endeavoring to take quickly and then develop a broad offensive into the interior of the nation.

Due to the aid of the Soviet Union, the armed might of the Afghan Armed Forces has risen and the government forces, regardless of the desperate efforts by the opposition, continue basically to firmly hold on to the occupied garrisons and defensive lines.

Major enemy offensive actions have been repulsed around Jelalabad and Khost; its attempts to capture Qandahar and Herat were thwarted. The defenses of Kabul and other garrisons have been strengthened. The blockade has been lifted on the Khairaton—Kabul and Kabul—Jelalabad roads and basically their operation is ensured (considering the specific features of wartime).

The overall plan of enemy operations. The opposition has not abandoned its military-political goals. In mid-May of this year at a meeting in Peshawar with the participation of American and Pakistani representatives, it was announced that a new stage had commenced in the struggle to overthrow the existing regime in Afghanistan. The goals and means of conducting armed combat were clarified. However, the wagering of the opposition leaders and their foreign supporters on a military path for resolving the Afghan problem has encountered ever-growing resistance from those who should fight directly on the battlefield and has collided with the aspiration of the masses of the people to put an end to the war.

The opposition, considering the experience of the unsuccessful combat actions for it at Jelalabad and Khost, is putting ever-greater emphasis on subversive work among government troops, on their bribing and enticing them over to the opposition side. But these attempts by the opposition have been repudiated by a majority of the personnel and they continue unstintingly to carry out their duty.

The meeting in Islamabad approved a program for a new stage of "psychological warfare" against Afghanistan. This provides for the following:

- Creating the impression in the public of the inevitable rapid fall of the PDPA regime; fanning dissatisfaction in the Afghan army;
- Reinforcing the belief in a certain portion of the Afghan public that the fall of the PDPA regime will mark an end to bloodshed in the country;
- Persuading the Afghan and particularly the international community that the current "transitional government" would bring stability and flourishing to Afghanistan.

As objects of propaganda on Afghan territory, the meeting pointed to the following groups of the population: Moslem clergy, youth and students, the army (particularly the Air Force), state officials, women and ethnic groups.

In line with this at the given stage in the forefront is the political and ideological work with the personnel, the work with the tribes and the winning over to our side of the public, the commanders and fighters of the opposition forces. Not only the political bodies but all the commanders should be involved in this undertaking.

On the operational-strategic level, the immediate goal of the opposition forces is to broaden the simultaneous combat operations on the Jelalabad, Khost, Qandahar and Herat axes, around Kabul and in the northern regions of the nation.

From the tactical viewpoint, a new feature in the actions of the rebel forces is that they, fearing air and missile strikes, have begun to operate on the battlefield in a more dispersed formation (in groups of not more than 10-15 men). The bandit formations are undergoing reorganization and they are being given the basic (primary) traits of regular troops (elements of staffs, artillery, technical and rear services are appearing). Air defense are being organized on the battlefield. Near Khost there are regiments which are made up of from 3-4 to 5-6 bandit formations. Centralized logistic support for the rebel troops is being organized and this involves 72 nongovernmental organizations and firms on Pakistani territory.

All of this proves that the enemy has not only not abandoned but is broadening military operations against the government troops. As a whole, the situation in Afghanistan remains complex, contradictory and demands that we not only not relax but rather mobilize all our forces to defend our motherland.

Under the existing conditions, the main and most effective methods of actions for the Afghan Armed Forces can be a strategic defensive with the decisive concentrating of main efforts on carrying out the main tasks to defeat the most threatening enemy groupings piecemeal.

Particular attention must be given to firmly holding the areas of Jelalabad, Khost, Gardez, Ghazni and Qandahar by conducting an active defense.

One of the most important tasks for the Afghan Armed Forces is to abandon passive actions and activate troop operations. We have numerous positive examples. This includes the active troop operations at Jelalabad, on the Surhrud and Chapriar sectors, where by surprise actions we captured the positions of the enemy battle outposts; the bold actions at Qunduz and Qandahar, where the concentrations and preparations of the rebels were promptly detected and anticipatory strikes launched. Just at Jelalabad and Khost, over 10 enemy ammunition dumps were destroyed. Such actions should be planned everywhere and become the rule and not individual episodes.

For successfully resisting the counterrevolution, it is essential to continue to improve the organizational development of the Armed Forces and their command. Considering the wartime conditions, it is essential to achieve higher combat readiness, a combat attitude and vigilance, and in every possible way improve the question of induction and the training of reinforcements.

It is essential to continue steady work on improving the system of military command and control. In the first place, more concern must be shown for the interests of the matter as a whole and overcoming the narrow departmental approach; secondly, it is essential to raise the role of the General Staff as a headquarters body not only of the Ministry of Defense but also the Supreme High Command. It should more firmly coordinate the actions of the troops of all departments in their carrying out of combat operations. An important task is to establish a clear rule that the formations and units of all departments in the combat area are completely subordinate to the commanders of the corresponding corps and divisions and who in relation to all the troops act as the representatives of Headquarters Supreme High Command in the zones of their responsibility. They bear personal responsibility for the actions of the troops of all departments.

An order from a superior level is a law for subordinates and it should be carried out precisely, unswervingly and on time. But the most important, of course, is the organizing of carrying out the taken decisions and set tasks. It is essential that the senior chiefs personally set the task for the executors. After this there must be continuous, intense work at the command posts, including, verification of whether the task is correctly understood; whether the troops have begun to carry it out; when necessary clarification of the tasks, the order for implementing them and working steadily that they be carried out under any circumstances.

It is essential to make clear to all that with a further intensification of military operations by the rebels and with the exacerbating of the situation, laxness, inefficiency and negligence in troop command can lead to major failures. For this reason, a further improvement in troop command and control is a matter of primary importance.

In the troops it is essential to organize continuous combat training, particularly for the tank troops, artillery, drivers and other specialists. It is essential, on the one hand, to improve the work of the training centers, to shorten the period of instruction in them and constantly send new recruits there, and on the other, to train the men in each unit and subunit and thereby prepare specialists.

I would also like to draw the attention of the leadership to the need of showing concern for the state of the weapons and equipment. Any commander or chief is responsible for having the weapons and equipment always in working order.

In conclusion, I would like to draw attention to the importance of a fundamental improvement in the political work in the troops and the concern for the personnel, since these tasks are inseparable. In assessing our work self-critically, the effectiveness of it remains insufficient. In the indoctrinational work with the personnel there is a great deal of formalism and isolation from life. If the activity of a hunter or a marksman in combat were judged just from the number of rounds got off, everyone would laugh. But we often assess indoctrinational work precisely from the number of conducted measures and not from its effectiveness. These shortcomings must be overcome decisively.

Under conditions where the enemy is endeavoring to win over our soldiers to its side, the questions of political work and ensuring the reliability of the troops should be the concern of ministers themselves and the commanders of all levels. The Main Political Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, the political directorates of the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Internal Affairs must fundamentally reorganize their work. The main task is that all the officers, sergeants and soldiers understand the political situation, the rightness of our undertaking and serve worthily. It is essential to improve the work of the party organizations and the Democratic Society of Afghan Youth.

The commanders, the political, rear and medical bodies must make it a law in their activities to show daily concern for the personnel, including for the officers, pilots and technical personnel of the air units.

Each day we must inspect and pose severe demands for the prompt delivery of food and water to the posts where the personnel are serving. We must promptly dispatch the needed medicines to Jelalabad, Khost and other regions where the troops are in particular need of them.

We must also in every possible way strengthen military discipline, and maintain order and organization everywhere. Vigilance must be increased at the guard and defensive posts.

Thus, a crucial, decisive stage is arriving in our struggle and this can and should be crowned with our complete victory. But in the very difficult situation we must not let up or be satisfied with what we have achieved. The

enemy is strong and each of us and the subordinate troops must make a maximum effort and show untinting work in carrying out the historic tasks which life has raised for us. Looking at us with great hope are all the people, all the honest persons in the world who support us. And we must not shirk on strength and labor to justify this hope and be up to the great historic mission resting on us.

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VIEWPOINTS, JUDGMENTS, VERSIONS

Education by History

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[Article by Lt Gen Avn V.V. Serebryannikov, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor; Col V.A. Karnoukhov, doctor of historical sciences: "To Educate by History"]

[Text] Last year, the newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published on its pages interesting reflections by the delegate to the 19th All-Union Party Conference, Military Pilot 1st Class, Guards Capt N. Belitskiy. We have been seriously concerned by everything that this young officer had to say. And above all, we were struck by his questions such as: "...Why at times do you see sad faces at meetings with war veterans? Why is it not considered shameful for men under any pretext to avoid army service? Why, finally, do little boys not play Chkalov, Gromov or Chapayev? Are the boys different? No, the education is."

A bitter rebuke for all of us, educators and social scientists! And it must be admitted that the rebuke is completely justified. In actuality, why in a portion of the youth does the heroic past of our people not cause a proper response in the soul? Why do the young people show little interest in serving in the Army and Navy? Undoubtedly, it is impossible to provide a pat answer to these questions.

For example, it can be said that our children do not know the history of their country or know it poorly, or are little informed on the heroic path of the Soviet Armed Forces. This would correspond to the truth, since the teaching of history in the school as well as in the military schools is far from ideal and from the present requirements of the party. There is a great deal of dryness and academism! Why can we not get rid of elements of formalism and dogmatism. We also have no good textbooks and for this we are in great debt to the people.

But it seems to us that this is not the only reason. Recently, in the press there have been numerous interesting materials on our historical past. The Soviet public, the men of the Army and Navy have greeted with approbation the objective publications describing the tragic fate of a number of the prominent party and

military leaders who became the innocent victims of the Stalinist repressions. Undoubted contributions have been made by the mass information media, the writers and commentators who have endeavored to eliminate the "blank spots of history" and describe it truthfully.

But here certain journalists have lost their sense of measure. As a result, the history of our motherland and the Communist Party are presented as a chain of complete errors and crimes. This is done with such exaggeration of the facts and such emphaticness that even a reader with great experience in life let alone a young one is overcome by confusion.

Let us take the most acute question of Stalin. Linked to his name are deviations from the Leninist concept of socialist construction, crimes against legality, and the tragedy of thousands upon thousands of innocent persons who suffered from the repressions. This person also caused great damage to the Soviet Armed Forces. Stalin's guilt to our people and the party is measureless. But is it correct to view his life and activity separately from the life and activity of the people and all the more replace the heroic history of the Soviet people and the party by Stalin's history.

Stalin and his circle were to blame for many errors and abuses of power during the years of the Great Patriotic War. Historians have yet to provide an exhaustive assessment of Stalin's activities during this period. However, one cannot agree with the assertion that a mentally impaired person was supposedly at the head of the nation and the Armed Forces. Even more objectionable is the intentional or unintentional desire by individual authors by unmasking Stalinism to play down the mass heroism of the Soviet people during the war years and the importance of the Great Victory. A strong protest must also be made over attempts to depict the Great Patriotic War as not so Patriotic and not to Great due to the enormous losses. On the question of such judgments, one would like to say: "Don't give way to emotions. Certainly anger has never been a good adviser."

As was very correctly pointed out by the prominent Soviet movie director A. Dovzhenko: two people look down; one sees a puddle and the other sees stars. Each to his own. We are not urging that only stars be seen in the history of our people. But it would be unreasonable not to notice them. In sharply condemning the errors and crimes of the past, the party, as was pointed out at the July (1988) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee by M.S. Gorbachev categorically rejects the attempts to obliterate the historic accomplishments of the Soviet people.²

Certain comrades feel that over the decades the history of the nation has been presented in an overembellished form and now we must concentrate completely on showing all the negative. Then, supposedly, everything would balance out.

In our view, they are profoundly confused. One must not forget the educating of new generations of Soviet people

who are interested not in the substituting of one semi-truth for another but rather the history of the nation with all its complexity and dialectical contradictoriness. We feel that at present, when the party is urging the people to increase their personal involvement in creative work related to the revolutionary renewal of Soviet society, a moment has come requiring a shifting of accents in propagandizing the history of our state and Armed Forces and moving to show the actually complete, all-round truth of history.

We are convinced that at present one of the most important tasks for all ideological workers is to strengthen the education of the Soviet people, particularly the youth, in the revolutionary and military traditions of our people, the Soviet Army and Navy, without ceasing to consistently unmask the cult of personality and its consequences and criticizing the negative phenomena from the period of stagnation and in our times.

In other words, it is essential to educate the Soviet people and the Army and Navy personnel in correctly treating history. At present, there is not a single public affairs article which does not contain appeals for this. But the entire issue is how to understand the truth and what hides behind this demand? Here it is usually apparent that there are different viewpoints on this question and sometimes even contradictory ones. The real truth of history, in our opinion, is not the simple copying of various historical events, facts and phenomena.

Historical truth is a scientific reflection in the minds of people of the essential elements of historical events or phenomena based upon objective, documentary data taken not in isolation but rather in a system, in a contradictory dialectical unity and being the result of analysis and synthesis which is carried out in accord with a Marxist-Leninist methodology.

The basic principles in investigating historical events are, as is known, an historical approach, objectivity and party loyalty.

Marxism-Leninism proceeds from the view that a correct approach to assessing any historical event requires that one not forget the main historical link, to view it from the standpoint of how this event arose in history, what were the main stages in its development, and from the viewpoint of this development examine what the given event had now become.³ Marxism-Leninism teaches that one must not isolate a phenomenon and remove it from the real conditions, the complex interactions with other phenomena. Such an isolating inevitably leads to major historical errors.

An obligatory principle for a historian in research is the principle of objectivity. With such an approach no room remains for a subjective assessment of facts and phenomena, for the manifesting of personal sympathies and antipathies. At the same time, Marxism-Leninism requires on the part of the historian in assessing any

event the direct and open propounding of a viewpoint of a certain class and seeing the profound class essence of any phenomenon.

If we wish to educate the Soviet people and the men of the Army and Navy in true historical truth, and the party challenges us to do precisely this, we are obliged above all to establish the truth of history and examine it.

In our view, it is possible to find the truth only in turning to Leninism and the works of V.I. Lenin. A creative reading of the works of the leader and a profound analysis and skillful use of the very rich revolutionary practical experience will help determine the correct path in the future.

The works of V.I. Lenin demonstrate well the importance of studying history for the worker movement. Thus, in 1914, in the article "Ideological Struggle in the Worker Movement," Vladimir Ilich wrote: "A person who relates, like Ivan Nepomnyashchii, to the history of his movement cannot be a conscientious worker."⁴ In another article written in the same year, V.I. Lenin sharpened this idea. He pointed out: "For the conscientious workers there is no task more important than understanding the importance of their movement and to know it precisely."⁵ And to know this in full accord with the historical truth. And this can be done only in independently studying and profoundly analyzing the existing facts.

At present, a creative search for the truth, the historical truth, is underway. In the press different viewpoints are being voiced on the same questions and not only among the public affairs writers and commentators but also the historians. Under these conditions, exceptional significance is assumed by the advice of V.I. Lenin on the need for critical independent approach in assessing various historical events.⁶

We feel that at present for the military historians it is very important to return again and again to the Leninist concept of the socialist army and to the first experience of its organizational development and strengthening.

How did V.I. Lenin see the army of a socialist state?

Vladimir Ilich felt that a socialist army is an army which should "protect the victories of the revolution and our people's power" an army which differs fundamentally from the Tsarist Army and from the armed forces of any capitalist state. If the Old Army, the army of barracks drill and humiliating of the soldiers, said V.I. Lenin at the 3d All-Russian Congress of Soviets, has retreated into the past, if it has been scrapped and not a stone remains of it, then in its place a democratic army should arise.⁸ This is an army of high conscious discipline and organization closely tied to the people and led by the communist party.⁹

Precisely such principles lay at the basis of the founding and activities of the Red Army.

It must also be said that during the first years of Soviet power, the party gave primary significance to raising the creative activeness of the masses, to employing democratic methods in organizing the life and activities of the troops. At the 1st Congress of Red Army Political Workers, it was pointed out, for example, that all political indoctrination should be aimed at evoking in the Red Armymen and commanders an interest in creativity and in obtaining a unified and as fully complete communist ideology as possible as well as at ensuring the successful execution of combat tasks.¹⁰

In other words, it was an issue that all the Red Armymen performed their duties and acted not out of routine, in being guided by a dogma, but rather creatively and with initiative.

One cannot help but note the democratic nature of the measures to introduce the first military uniform and insignias. By the Order of the Republic Revolutionary Military Council No. 310 of 28 November 1918, it was determined that all servicemen in the directorates and facilities of the military department, **in performing official duties**, were to wear a revolutionary military insignia in the form of a red star with a hammer and a plow on it. A star was to be worn on headgear, in the form of a chest insignia on the coat and sleeve on the left side or in the buttonhole of a civilian coat, **according to desire**¹¹ (emphasis ours.—Authors).

On 18 December 1919, insignias were introduced for command personnel.¹² At first, after this individual Red Armymen did not understand the necessity of introducing insignias. The commanders, the political workers and all the communists patiently explained to the personnel that the insignias established for the command personnel of the Red Army had nothing in common with the former insignias of the officers in the Tsarist Army, as they designated only an official position and did not provide any of the rights which the Tsarist officers and generals had. They said that their introduction was necessary so that each soldier could see with what officials he was dealing. Particular attention was paid to demonstrating the unity of the social origin and social interests of the command and rank-and-file.

At the same time, the party demanded that the commanders and chiefs designated by the corresponding insignias be a model of outstanding execution of service, heroism in battle, high conscientiousness and comradely politeness.¹³

During the years of the Civil War, *glasnost* was an effective means in the fight for high conscious discipline. The names of servicemen who maliciously violated the military procedures were published in the press regardless of the positions held. Such persons, as a rule, were expelled from the ranks of the Red Army.

At present, each of us is inclined to serious reflection from the experience of the party's struggle against any privileges for the communists, against bureaucracy, careerism and other negative trends which appeared

during the first years after the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution. In the Circular Letter of the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee to all party members "On the Strengthening of the Red Army" of 14 July 1919, it was pointed out: "We must assimilate once and for all the notion that there can be no, not even the slightest privileges for the communist collectives in the Red Army and in addition the members of these collectives cannot and should not have such in any event. In places, it has been noted that the communist collectives, the buros of the collectives, the company buros of communists and so forth have various good quarters while at the same time the entire remaining troop unit is in great need of quarters. This usually causes complaints and dissatisfaction among the Red Armymen. The collectives of communists should not differ in any way from the general Red Army milieu with the exception of greater self-dedication and tenacity."¹⁴

The 8th Party Congress demanded a reworking of the military regulations and the elimination from them of all provisions setting unnecessary privileges for the command personnel.¹⁵

In the Circular Letter of the RKP(b) Central Committee "On Strengthening the Red Army," manifestations of bureaucracy and inefficiency were pointed out in the ideological work of the political departments: "Our political departments in places have begun to suffer from bureaucracy. In a whole number of instances, the enemy has conducted more energetic agitation than is being done by our political departments. The enemy is inventive and at the same time our political departments often act routinely. The political departments fill out many papers but the workers from the political departments far from everywhere are in sufficiently close touch with the Red Army masses. Our political departments should remember that they are not bureaucratic departments but rather the most important bodies of the revolutionary struggle.... The political department members should be the most popular persons in the regiments."¹⁶

The 9th All-Russian Conference of the RKP(b) held in 1920 pointed out to the members of the revolutionary military councils, to the commissars and other officials from the Red Army that they were obliged to fight decisively against the routine of the old military system and against the manifestations of any sort of bureaucracy, to be in the thick of the Red Army and working masses, hold conversations, and provide information on the situation on the fronts and in the rear. The conference demanded that responsible workers be assigned to the Red Army cells.¹⁷

In line with the examination of certain aspects of the Leninist notion of a socialist army, we would like to express fundamental disagreement with a number of provisions found in the article by Lt Col A. Savinkin "What Sort of Army Do We Need."¹⁸ The author, in particular, raises the question of a "certain disassociation in the relations between society and the army,"¹⁹

and in backing up this thesis, mentions among other causes the following: "The state-political alienation of the army from the people during various periods in the development of our history."²⁰

It is hard to say precisely what period A. Savinkin has in mind, but we could not mention such a period. Yes, in the history of our nation there were the mass Stalinist repressions, including in the Red Army and Navy. They must be viewed as the most tragic consequences of Stalin's cult of personality. But what does this have to do with the relations of the army and the people? Any honest researcher with complete justification could say that the unity of the army and the people was unshakable in all stages of the development of Soviet society.

At present, a number of authors who have proposed shifting our army from a professional one to a territorial militia principle of organization feel that the founders of Marxism-Leninism always favored a militia army and that the transition of the RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army] to a professional basis meant a retreat from a Leninist approach to the establishing of Armed Forces and caused our setbacks at the beginning and in the course of the war against the Nazis and that a militia army would have prevented the retreat to Moscow and Stalingrad and ensured a more rapid victory with minimal losses.

In actuality, the founders of Marxism-Leninism asserted that the victorious proletariat could defend itself successfully against an invasion of the regular armies of the bourgeois states with its own regular army of workers and peasants.²¹ V.I. Lenin, when the Civil War and the foreign military intervention began, belittled those who assumed that it was possible to drive off an attack by regular imperialist armies using party formations and emphasized that at present in the forefront there should be a regular army for only it was capable of providing a complete victory and for this reason it was important to protect and safeguard its combat capability like the apple of your eye.

At present, when the imperialist states are strengthening their regular armies, to switch our armed forces to a militia system would mean to lose military-strategic parity and knowingly put ourselves in a disadvantageous position.

The conclusion which can be drawn proceeding from the almost 15-year experience of organizing a territorial militia army in our nation (from the mid-1920s until the end of the 1930s) is just one: in all regards, such an army was several levels below a regular one; it was unable to master the complex types of weapons and military equipment and become a dependable defense against the regular, technically equipped imperialist armies.

One of the reasons for our setbacks at the beginning of the Patriotic War was the delay in converting our then basically territorial militia army to a professional (regular) one. This was persuasively described by Mar G.K.

Zhukov²² and other prominent military leaders. Without a regular army we would not have lasted in the war.

It also seems dubious to pose as an urgent problem the converting of our army into a "small professional one." The theories of "small professional armies," as is known, appeared after World War I in the West. One of the founders, the English military historian and theorist, J. Fuller, considered the ideal army to be one consisting of a single man who by pressing a button could put a powerful technical war machine into action. These theories were never and could not be implemented, as modern war requires mass armies. Certainly, are not modern Western armies mass ones?

The United States has regular Armed Forces numbering 2,130,000 men, a National Army [Guard] and Reserve of 1,160,000 men, that is, a total of 3,290,000 men. In Europe and on the adjacent seas and oceans, the North Atlantic Alliance keeps in high combat readiness a group of 3.5 million men with over 600,000 of them being Americans. As a total throughout the world, there are 26-27 million servicemen under arms. As for the professional nature of the armies, this is determined, in the first place, by the level of real training of the personnel and, secondly, by the method of manning (by volunteer, on the basis of universal military service, mercenary recruitment). In judging from the first indication, our army has a clearly expressed imprint of professionalism, for its personnel in all regards is trained on a professional level for conducting modern combat, for maximum utilization of the capabilities of the weapons and combat equipment while the presently occurring perestroika makes it possible to discover new reserves for increasing combat skill. Virtually all Soviet officers have a higher education.

However, a professional army is usually considered one where all the men—from the rank-and-file to the commander-in-chief—are professionals, that is, they devote their life or a portion of it to military service. But in the Western armies which are called professional, the rank-and-file and NCOs serve by mercenary recruitment. And some are urging us to do this now. In the founders of Marxism-Leninism we will not find such notions, no matter how we might try. They very thoroughly investigated the professional armies of the past, particularly the bourgeois ones. Here they focused attention on the sociopolitical factors and consequences of establishing such armies and established what caused the strengthening of their reactionary, aggressive, antipopular and antidemocratic nature. We must not forget the lessons of the past. The founders of our revolutionary teaching spoke about the progressiveness and advantages of armies organized on universal military service, particularly on the moral and political level. The mercenary of "stand-in" for the citizen can be a good professional, particularly if he received high wages for service, but mercantilism and a utilitarian approach are not the best basis for developing a conscientious attitude toward military duty. This is why we feel that the mercenary

principle scarcely corresponds to the nature of an army in a socialist state. The carrying out of this principle would lead to a restricting of the tie between the army and the people and does not provide an opportunity to ensure equal responsibility of the citizens and their actual involvement in carrying out the duty of defending the motherland, as well as constantly replace the main personnel, establish the required reserves and so forth.

In the opinion of authoritative specialists, a professional, mercenary army is more expensive and requires greater material and financial investments. This can be seen from American experience, where outlays on the Armed Forces have become so enormous that they have alarmed realistically thinking politicians and scientists and have played a major role in forming the enormous budget deficit.

The experience of our army indicates that a regular army which combines a professional officer corps with a constantly changing basic personnel, provides an opportunity to ensure high combat readiness and capability of the troops, to have sufficient reserves available, to provide each young man with knowledge and inculcate the necessary skills for performing his military duty and realizing the idea of the nationwide defense of socialism.

Characteristically, certain military "professionals" arguing in favor of such a reform have sided with the extremist organizations like the "Democratic Union" which is in favor of introducing alternative civilian service in the army for those not wishing to carry out their military duty, their constitutional obligations. But it is completely naive to believe that a militia army could be a professional one where highly professional productive work is combined with military professionalism. The proposal of eradicating command methods in the army cannot help but evoke a smile. We must not blindly follow the conviction that if these methods are to be eliminated (and rightly so) from the economy and from the political system, then they must also be abandoned in the army! The army, as long as it exists, cannot function normally without command methods. However, the latter should not narrow the possibilities for the development of democracy, glasnost and a full spiritual life for the personnel.

At present, when sharp debates are underway over various historical questions, it is useful from time to time to recall Lenin's demand on the necessity for a sober consideration of the situation and which, as V.I. Lenin wrote, cannot be replaced by "mere attitude" or by the "waving of red flags."²³ As was already pointed out above, the real truth of history is the truth reflecting accurate facts of reality in their unity and interdependence. Any distortion of the facts cannot provide a complete and consequently correct picture of a historical event.

Let us demonstrate this by certain examples.

In our view, recently there has not always been a correct interpretation of certain events preceding World War II and the Great Patriotic War.

At times, new materials are presented in such a manner that the readers might feel that if, for example, there had not been Stalin's erroneous line vis-a-vis the Social Democratic parties of Europe, then Hitler would not have come to power in Germany. Of course, there were errors committed by the Soviet leadership in those years. But still one must see that the main responsibility for the rise of this historical paradox rests on the leaders of the Western European rightist Social Democracy who in the interwar period actively carried out an anti-Soviet, anti-socialist policy and, in essence, were against an alliance with the communists. Thus, at their congress in Marseilles, they stated that "world Bolshevism" is a factor most threatening the cause of peace. Karl Kautsky, being one of the leaders of Western European Social Democracy, urged the sweeping of Bolshevism out of the way....

These, like many other actions by the rightist Social Democracy, provided the grounds for S.M. Kirov to say at a meeting of the aktiv in the Leningrad Party Organization on 4 November 1941: "It is perfectly logical that not only Poincare, not only Briand and the other high priests of capitalism want an intervention against the USSR but also the Second International is going to help them."²⁴

All of this shows that there are no grounds for justifying the action of the Western European Social Democracy in the period between the two world wars just as, incidentally, all Social Democrats should be equated with the camp of the social fascists.

There is also the acute question of the degree of the military danger for the nation in the 1930s. The danger of a war has been clearly understated by the facile hand of certain writers and even scholars. At present, it is simpler to judge this from the standpoint of modern times. However, was it really possible, for instance, at the end of the 1920s or in the 1930s, to know precisely when war would break out? Our military-political leadership, proceeding from the Leninist notion of the inevitability of new wars in defense of the socialist fatherland, felt that was was inevitable. This idea runs as a constant theme literally through all the speeches of the party, state and military leaders in the interwar period.

From the end of the 1920s, the direct threat of a war deriving from international imperialism could be felt very acutely. The complexity of the situation was understood both in the upper echelons of power as well as on the spot, in the districts and fleets. For example, the plan for combat training of the Naval Forces of the Baltic Sea for the 1927-1928 winter training period stated: "The international situation is presently such that the Soviet Union at any moment could be attacked."²⁵

In speaking at the 7th World Comintern Congress, G. Dimitrov emphasized that one of the particular features

in the international situation in the mid-1930s was the extreme heightening of the danger of imperialist aggression against the USSR and a new world war. The increased threat of attack by the imperialists on the Soviet Union, he pointed out, was caused by the offensive of the reaction and fascism in a number of the capitalist countries and which were the main initiators of a new crusade against the countries of socialism. Fascism had become the main danger for the cause of peace, democracy and socialism.²⁶

Under those conditions where there was a constantly growing threat of imperialist aggression, the party became convinced of the need not to skip but rather in the shortest historical time literally run the distance from the sledgehammer and the peasant plow to developed industry without which the perishing of the entire cause of the revolution was inevitable.

It is a shame that individual public affairs writers distort the historical facts, and particularly when this is a sin of scientists and above all historians. We were greatly saddened by the interview given with the newspaper *VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA* by Academician A.M. Samsonov on 21 June 1988. It, in particular, asserted that supposedly the Soviet-German Treaty on Friendship and the Frontier between the USSR and Germany concluded in Moscow on 28 September 1939 had not been published in our press. In this regard, only one thing can be said: the treaty was published in 1946 and one has merely to look at the 4th volume of "Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR" [Documents of Soviet Foreign Policy].²⁷

The lack of agreement found in a number of materials on historical questions is also perplexing. Nor has this been avoided, unfortunately, by our favorite newspaper *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA*. Thus, on 4 June 1988, it published a generally interesting article by A. Khorev entitled, "Marshal Tukhachevskiy." Here it was pointed out that in December 1927, M.N. Tukhachevskiy turned to I.V. Stalin in a letter about "rearming the army," and in May 1928, received a new appointment (he became the commander of the Leningrad Military District). The author does not indicate what sort of rearmament M.N. Tukhachevskiy was proposing or why he was appointed to the commander of a military district from holding a position of chief of staff of the RKKA. This creates the grounds for various conjectures. But if A. Khorev had explained to the readers that it was a question of the insufficiently balanced, unrealistic proposal of M.N. Tukhachevskiy to produce during the year some 50,000-100,000 tanks of the English Christie design, then they would take a calmer attitude toward the government decision on removing M.N. Tukhachevskiy from the post of chief of staff of the RKKA. It might be recalled that 3 years after this event, M.N. Tukhachevskiy, as a man sincerely favoring the arming of the Red Army with new combat equipment and weapons, was again promoted and appointed to the post of deputy people's commissar for armament. We feel that the full rehabilitation of the innocent victims of the Stalinist repressions does not

provide grounds for their absolute idealization. However, this is out of fashion at present. However, such fashion never can coexist with historical truth.

Numerous obstacles have risen on the path to complete historical truth. And they can be overcome only by the joint efforts of all the historians and by their constant, conscientious work.

The educational importance of the truth of history is great. This can be demonstrated from the example of the educational role of negative historical experience. Such experience suggests to the researcher that it is impossible, for example, to allow a cult of personality which causes enormous harm to people, to socialist construction and to national defense.

However, a study of negative experience does not provide an answer to the question of what must be done and how to carry out one or another creative task. Without fail this must be done creatively and supplemented by research on positive experience considering the new historical conditions.

It is important to find and make available such examples to modern youth. Let us be frank. Recently, the positive hero has virtually left our literature and has disappeared from the pages of many of our magazines and newspapers. Why are there now no films which would bring us the complete historical truth about the Great Patriotic War and about the feats of our men who carried out their international duty in Afghanistan. Where is the solution? It seems to us that we must return more boldly and energetically the positive hero to our literature and to the pages of the press, without, however, varnishing life as was the case in the not distant past.

It is essential, in our view, to accelerate the elaboration of teaching materials on the history of the Soviet state, its Armed Forces and the history of the CPSU considering the new data obtained from the archives.

The corresponding studies are presently underway in many VUZes but they, unfortunately, are not being coordinated on the level of the Armed Forces. In our view, it would be advisable to begin the discussions on the pages of *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNIYKH SIL*, *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* and *VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL* on the questions of the history of the Soviet Armed Forces. We must obviously announce an army-wide competition for the best historical works.

Footnotes

1. *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA*, 24 July 1988.
2. *PRAVDA*, 30 July 1988.
3. See, V.I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 39, p 67.
4. *Ibid.*, Vol 25, p 131.

5. Ibid., p 227.
 6. Ibid., Vol 23, p 68.
 7. Ibid., Vol 35, p 216.
 8. Ibid., p 269.
 9. Ibid., Vol 37, pp 70, 123, 167, 382; Vol 36, p 234.
 10. TsGASA [Central State Archives of the Soviet Army], folio 9, inv. 5, file 68, sheets 32-34.
 11. Ibid., folio 4, inv. 3, file 49, sheet 187.
 12. Ibid., file 51, sheets 88-90.
 13. Ibid., file 59, sheet 82.
 14. "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh... i resheniyakh syezdov, konferentsiy i plennumov TsK" [The CPSU in Resolutions...and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums], Moscow, Politizdat, 8th Revised and Supplemented Edition, Vol 2, 1970, p 111.
 15. Ibid., p 70.
 16. Ibid., p 112.
 17. Ibid., p 193.
 18. MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, 6 November 1988.
 19. Ibid.
 20. Ibid.
 21. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], Vol 7, p 519.
 22. See: KOMMUNIST, No 6, 1988, pp 99-100.
 23. V.I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 44, p 241.
 24. LPA [Leningrad Party Archives], folio 24, inv. 1, stor. unit 330, p 16.
 25. TsGA VMF [Central State Naval Archives], folio R-34, inv. 2, stor. unit 1333, sheet 4.
 26. Georgiy Dimitrov, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Works], Moscow, Gospolitizdat, Vol 2, 1957, p 375.
 27. "Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR" [Documents of Soviet Foreign Policy], Moscow, Gospolitizdat, Vol IV, 1946, pp 452-453.
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